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Authority essay estrangement knowledge self

Moran, R.: Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self

how is it possible for there to be knowledge of some contingent matter of fact (e. his claims about the incompleteness and fallibility of this mode of awareness are thus in sharper opposition to the radical cartesian claims of the mind's transparency to itself than they are to much of the commonsense understanding of self-knowledge (a discourse that allows for the possibility of difficulty and failure here, and doesn't contain terms like 'introspective infallibility'). it's natural to take the normal importance of self-consciousness for granted and to assume we understand what its importance is, but it should not be so obvious once we reflect that mental phenomena may be identified in many different ways (neurologically, computationally, in everyday terms), and that many perfectly rational and adaptive processes neither require nor tolerate self-conscious monitoring for their proper functioning. in authority and estrangement, richard moran argues for a reconception of the first-person and its claims. what we are identifying as the full-blown cartesian picture of introspection combines both the strong epistemic claims of infallibility and self-intimation, and the characteristic perceptual model of just what manner of awareness introspection is. it is modeling self-consciousness on the theoretical awareness of objects that obscures the specifically first-person character of the phenomenon, whether or not this theoretical perspective takes the specific form of the perceptual model of introspection. and indeed, the contemporary rejection of this thesis has led various philosophers to reject the idea that there is anything philosophically distinctive about self-knowledge as a type of awareness. as subsequent chapters will show, this entails not only rejection of the "inner eye" as applied to the mechanism of introspection, but an account of the general distortions of the purely theoretical or spectator's stance toward the self (both as expressed in philosophical accounts of introspection, and in the life of the self). a more complete characterization of the first-person perspective will require bringing the agent more explicitly into the picture, and doing so will involve taking the discussion into a range of issues concerning the agent's perspective of deliberation and self-interpretation that have not been at the center of recent discussions of self-knowledge. and estrangement,Be the first to ask a question about authority and estrangement. boghossian briefly discusses some examples of what he means by "insubstantial" knowledge, such as the indexically grounded judgment that "i am here now," all of which examples share the feature that the appearance of knowledge is grounded purely logically (or transcendentally), and hence that the denial of any such statement would involve some kind of immediate incoherence. for my purposes, then, it is crucial that we keep separate the questions of conceptual dependence and the question of the substantiality of self-knowledge. indeed, he writes, a more thorough repudiation of the idea of privileged inner observation leads to a deeper appreciation of the systematic differences between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others, differences that are both irreducible and constitutive of the very concept and life of the person.

Critical Notice of Richard Moran, Authority and Estrangement: An

if introspective awareness is anything at all--that is, anything distinct from the knowledge of the mental life of others--then it seems it must be something different from any knowledge based on inference. drawing on certain themes from wittgenstein, sartre, and others, the book explores the extent to which what we say about ourselves is a matter of discovery or of creation, the difficulties and limitations in being ''objective'' toward ourselves, and the conflicting demands of realism about oneself and responsibility for oneself. (i will have comparatively little to say here about the case of sensations, which i believe raises issues for self-knowledge quite different from the case of attitudes of various kinds. but in such a case my belief would not thereby acquire the attributes we have in mind when we apply the term 'conscious' as a characterization of the belief itself. for independent of this picture there remains a set of basic asymmetries between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others, which point to a different set of philosophical questions concerning how self-relations necessarily differ from relations with others. the phenomena of self-knowledge participate in this duality of perspective, and it is only under some descriptions and not others that the person's own description of his state is accorded any kind of privilege. one striking fact about this story is that although largely cartesian assumptions about the mind's access to itself dominated both epistemology and philosophy of mind since the seventeenth century, it wasn't until the twentieth century that the problem of the person's "privileged access" to his own mental life was treated as a philosophical issue in its own right. perhaps unsurprisingly, attention has tended to concentrate on the particular relation of knowledge; and even more particularly, on the specifically first-person awareness we normally take ourselves to have of our own mental life. the fortunes of self-consciousness: descartes, freud, and cognitive science the legacy of cartesianism has been decisive in the philosophy of mind not only in the positive influence it exerted in the centuries immediately following descartes, but just as much in the force of its repudiation in the twentieth century. this has contributed not only to a narrow view of the range and variety of first-person knowledge, but also to a distorting emphasis on various extreme and contentious claims about its nature and extent, which has deflected attention away from the basic differences that remain between knowledge of oneself and knowledge of others, even after the abandonment of anything resembling "introspective infallibility. the previous chapter i sketched out a picture of self-knowledge as. one thing that is unsatisfying about any perceptual model of self-consciousness is that perception is a relation that, in principle, should be possible with respect to a whole range of phenomena of a certain type. nor need it make any essential difference if it were my own belief that i was consciously reflecting on, if i attribute it to myself under a name or description i don't recognize.

Sample Chapter for Moran, R.: Authority and Estrangement: An

and in both the case of actions and attitudes, self-consciousness makes a difference to what the person's responsibilities and capacities are, with respect to his involvement in their development. and even when, in the twentieth century, the nature of "first-person authority" was identified as a philosophical issue of its own, the primary interest was not so much to investigate or defend the assumption itself as, rather, to give an account of how such privileged access was possible, and to find ways to accommodate certain assumptions of infallibility within the logic of first-person discourse. what we have so far characterized as the specifically first-person manner of awareness that qualifies a belief or other attitude as a conscious one is an awareness that is immediate, nonobservational, and involves reference to oneself through use of the pronoun 'i', rather than by means of some mediating description under which the person might fail to recognize himself. 128) clearly, some kind of reconception of the mind and its access to itself is represented in this development, but to take the apparent scientific opposition at face value would be to miss what is distinctive about first-person access. socrates, and through descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's self-understanding. what emerges is a strikingly original and psychologically nuanced exploration of the contrasting ideals of relations to oneself and relations to others. my whole relation to this assumption is now different, and the belief itself no longer has the secure, taken-for-granted quality it had before. and in what sense is this knowledge supposed to be essentially or exclusively first-personal? if such a person would lack ordinary self-knowledge, then something is missing from our original characterization of the target notion. and, of course, he may equally well take it for granted that he himself does not differ from his friend in this respect, again without the thought ever occurring to him. and in cases like these, such judgments share just the features that boghossian later cites as the earmarks of genuine cognitive achievement, and which distinguish them from the earlier cases of "insubstantial" or self-verifying judgments (p., published by Princeton University PressGoogle contents of this website:Google full text of our books:Authority and estrangement:an essay on self-knowledgerichard moranbook description | endorsements | table of contentscopyright notice: published by princeton university press and copyrighted, © 2001, by princeton university press. this is a general form of cognitivity that any account of introspection as a source of knowledge would seek to preserve.

Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.

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indeed, he writes, a more thorough repudiation of the idea of privileged inner observation leads to a deeper appreciation of the systematic differences between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others, differences that are both irreducible and constitutive of the very concept and life of the person.) rather, such a conclusion would just clash with the kind of statement being made in an expression of self-knowledge, for there is generally no logical incoherence in the denial of a first-person statement of some attitude. the problematics of self-knowledge for both commonsense and freudian thought employ a conception of the mental that is distinct from both the cartesian picture and that of contemporary cognitive science, as different as these models are from each other. with respect to knowledge of the content of one's thought, and much other self-knowledge, it seems that the first possibility cannot be right. the authority which our self-ascriptions of meaning, intention, and decision assume is not based on any kind of cognitive advantage, expertise or achievement. a closely related problem with the model is posed by "externalism" about mental content, the claim that what a thought or belief is about may be determined by relations the person bears to various environmental factors of which he may have no knowledge at all. masterfully blending philosophy of mind and moral psychology, he develops a view of self-knowledge that concentrates on the self as agent rather than spectator. the claim to knowledge of one's own belief here could be doubted or denied without the incoherence that would follow upon denying the truth of "i am here now," and hence cannot be "insubstantial" in that sense. in cases like these, the cognitive terms used denote adverbial modifications of the activity itself. for while it is indeed difficult to conceive of the possibility of, for example, intense pain of which one is utterly unaware (a possibility which even freud himself, for instance, never countenanced), this is so for reasons quite specific to the special case of pain and does not carry over to motives, moods, beliefs, and the rest of what we commonly think of as belonging to the psychological. on such a model, then, there would seem to be no deep reason why one couldn't bear this quasi-perceptual relation to the mental life of another person as well as oneself. but the problem of self-knowledge is not set by the fact that first-person reports are especially good or reliable, but primarily by the fact that they involve a distinctive mode of awareness, and that self-consciousness has specific consequences for the object of consciousness. if a perceptual model is not tacitly assumed and we take self-knowledge to be "insubstantial" only in this second, stipulated sense (i.

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Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge by

," his point is not to suggest any doubt about what he is imagining, but to point out that "visual" properties do not determine content or one's knowledge of it (blue book, p. i am concerned with the application wright makes to the case of self-knowledge and the conclusions he draws from it. is the author of authority and estrangement: an essay on self-knowledge (princeton, 2001), and numerous articles in philosophy of mind and action, aesthetics, and philosophy of language, on topics including metaphor, agency and practical knowledge, testimony, wittgenstein, and other minds. not every form of self-knowledge has a claim to "inalienability," that is, can be shown to be a form of apprehension that is essentially and exclusively first-personal in its reference, but the forms we are concerned with here do raise the question of why this sort of apprehension should be restricted at all in its scope. in this way, grounding the general category of the mental in the paradigm of the experiential and the episodic lends a misleading plausibility to the characteristic cartesian claims of introspective infallibility and self-intimation." to reject a substantial epistemology for self-knowledge is to reject any form of the idea that it involves the awareness of some independently obtaining state of affairs. the possibility of self-knowledge: introspection, perception, and deflation what remains before us, then, is a basic asymmetry between first-person and third-person relations. of the book Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge by Moran, R. read this book for a philosophy class appropriately called "self-knowledge. put somewhat less paradoxically, prominent accounts of self-knowledge often end up either describing something that could just as well be a third-person phenomenon, or transposing an essentially third-person situation to some kind of mental interior. we do not only allow his statement to stand without the benefit of evidence, we also expect and sometimes insist that he take himself to be in a position to speak for his feelings and convictions, and not simply offer his best opinion about them. as suggested, sometimes doubt is cast on the very possibility of introspective self-knowledge by the lingering assumption of some kind of perceptual model for it. nor even if i knowingly attribute the belief to the person i recognize as myself, using the first-person pronoun, but, say, ascribe it to myself only on the basis of reading a letter i wrote last night (where i have reason to believe i still retain this belief, even though i can't now remember why).

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Précis of Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge

as a result, it is often assumed today that the idea of philosophically important differences between self-knowledge and knowledge of others depends on maintaining a thesis of introspective infallibility in some form or other. indeed, he writes, a more thorough repudiation of the idea of privileged inner observation leads to a deeper appreciation of the systematic differences between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others, differences that are both irreducible and constitutive of the very concept and life of the person. and the person himself may on occasion employ such third-person evidence in learning about his true emotional state. what emerges is a strikingly original and psychologically nuanced exploration of the contrasting ideals of relations to oneself and relations to others. constitutive relations and detection we are pursuing an understanding of self-knowledge that would make sense of both success and failure in introspection; that is, account for a person's introspective attempt to get something right, allow for the possibility of error and ignorance, and thus accommodate some independence of awareness and the object of awareness. independently of this model, we can characterize a set of basic asymmetries between knowledge of oneself and knowledge of others that survives philosophical attempts either to dismiss it or to explain it as a consequence of the merely spectatorial advantages of the first-person point of view. that leaves the option of seeing self-knowledge as "based on nothing. the topics it fleshes out are fascinating and impinge on our sense of moral responsibility, our entitlement to purports of self-knowledge (about who we are and what we know or believe). earlier, major figures within both empiricist and rationalist traditions could take for granted that there is nothing in the mind of which the person is not conscious, and that a person's knowledge of his own current mental states is both certain and infallible; in short, that the mind is "transparent" to itself. 93), such a state is not simply a disposition to assent to the proposition in question (a disposition which, since it doesn't require the cooperation of a desire in order to assert itself, mellor would place outside the class of genuine beliefs). second, there is the restriction in scope, not to a particular person, but to a particular class of facts about oneself, that characterizes this form of awareness. the "internal theater" of descartes (and locke and hume) and the long legacy of treating self-consciousness as a kind of inner perception is probably the most graphic expression of this approach, but the general tendency is broader than this. but the nonempirical or conceptual aspect of the phenomenon does not support either a conventionalist reconstruction of first-person authority, or a deflationary analysis of the claims of self-knowledge.

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MORAN ON SELF-KNOWLEDGE, AGENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY

so a statement such as "i believe i was born in minnesota," which has the appearance of an expression of self-knowledge, cannot be cognitively insubstantial in the logical or transcendental sense described. the following chapter takes up various senses of 'privilege' that have been thought to characterize a person's own conception of his thought and action, particularly as these are seen as having some "self-constituting" role. socrates, and through descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. a second concern will be to inquire how it is that philosophical accounts of self-knowledge often fail to account for (or sometimes even to describe) a specifically first-person phenomenon. the dependence of the cartesian picture on such specific epistemological motivation provides all the more reason not to identify it with the general problematics of self-knowledge. this chapter attempts to reorient some of our thinking about self-knowledge and place the more familiar epistemological questions in the context of wider self-other asymmetries which, when they receive attention at all, are normally discussed outside the context of the issues concerning self-knowledge." the wider view of self-other asymmetries, however, within which any such specific claims of first-person authority must take their bearings, obliges us to ground the discussion as much in moral psychology as in epistemology. for it would not just be disappointing or deflationary if self-knowledge were to turn out to be insubstantial in this sense. socrates, and through descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's self-understanding. much of our ordinary perceptual awareness is also taken to be immediate in this sense, and this particular model of immediacy, enshrined in the etymological connotations of the word 'introspection' itself, has irresistibly suggested to many philosophers that introspective awareness is immediate because it is itself a form of perception, a kind of "inward glance. however, the beginning of this section of the paper assumes a definition of "cognitive achievement" as knowledge of a contingent proposition that involves either observation or inference from some observation (p. read this book for a philosophy class appropriately called "self-knowledge. it is a commonplace in discussions of self-consciousness to conceive of the target notion in terms of second-order states, but d.

O'Brien, L. (2003), 'Moran on Agency and Self-Knowledge

if self-knowledge is indeed a form of knowledge, then it will be constituted by the person having thoughts about his state, and even more basically, by his conceiving of himself and his state in certain ways. once again, but now in a different way, self-knowledge is said to fail of a "substantial epistemology. Chapter for Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge by Moran, R. by itself the conclusion would pose no skeptical threat, for all it means is that introspective awareness is "immediate," in the sense of noninferential, and in addition is not to be construed as a form of perception." this, then, is taken to mean that so-called self-knowledge cannot in fact be seen as a "cognitive achievement" of any kind, and cannot sustain what he calls a "substantial epistemology. blending philosophy of mind and moral psychology, moran develops a view of self-knowledge that concentrates on the self as agent rather than spectator. exploring the bases and limitations of such a role brings the agent's perspective more squarely into the discussion of self-knowledge by way of relating the authority of the first-person to the role of the deliberator in determining his state of mind. the topics it fleshes out are fascinating and impinge on our sense of moral responsibility, our entitlement to purports of self-knowledge (about who we are and what we know or believe). a final purpose of this chapter is to show how the lingering influence of a cartesian picture of introspection creates unwarranted skepticism about the very possibility of self-knowledge. at this point, we encounter various difficulties in applying this picture, and instead of challenging the picture, philosophers may be more prepared to deny the substantiality of introspection itself. that is, it would be a mistake to see this theoretical development in terms of a single, stable conception of the mind, with respect to which philosophers and psychologists have somehow gone from seeing all its activities as transparent to itself to seeing virtually none of its activities as belonging to consciousness at all. what emerges is a strikingly original and psychologically nuanced exploration of the contrasting ideals of relations to oneself and relations to others..edu this file is also available in adobe acrobat pdf format chapter 1 the image of self-knowledge the question of the nature of first-person relations has not suffered from philosophical neglect in recent years.

Moran, R.: Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self

What to Read about Self-Knowledge - Self-knowledge for humans

however, the various services it has been pressed into, especially in the history of epistemology, have obscured the basic asymmetry and its rationale and freighted the idea of self-knowledge with a host of extraneous philosophical assumptions. and this capacity lies in the nature of the first-person position itself; it is not a kind of access he may have to the mind of another person. masterfully blending philosophy of mind and moral psychology, moran develops a view of self-knowledge that concentrates on the self as agent rather than spectator. nowhere is this clearer than in the question of the mind's access to itself and its operations. drawing on certain themes from wittgenstein, sartre, and others, he explores the extent to which what we say about ourselves is a matter of discovery or of creation, the difficulties and limitations in being objective toward ourselves, and the conflicting demands of realism about oneself and responsibility for oneself." thus, the argument from the three options offered for understanding the status of self-knowledge assumes the appropriateness of that picture and relies on it to raise its skeptical challenge. drawing on certain themes from wittgenstein, sartre, and others, the book explores the extent to which what we say about ourselves is a matter of discovery or of creation, the difficulties and limitations in being ''objective'' toward ourselves, and the conflicting demands of realism about oneself and responsibility for oneself. wright begins working out this account after canvassing various wittgensteinian objections to conceiving of one's knowledge of one's own intentions (and other mental states) as involving a kind of inner perception. | 6 x 9 add to shopping cartebook | isbn: 9781400842971 | our ebook editions are available from these online vendors endorsements | table of contentschapter 1 [html] or [pdf] google full text of this book:  since socrates, and through descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself." but there are in fact several aspects of one's relation to oneself as an agent which have been plausibly seen as involving awareness that is not based either on behavioral inference or any perceptual presentation. being the person whose mental life is brought to self-consciousness involves a stance of agency beyond that of being a kind of expert witness.., "contingent knowledge not based on observation or inference"), then it may well be a conclusion to be welcomed and not avoided. and this requires doing better justice to the "reflexive" aspect of first-person awareness than we have done so far, including the relation of self-knowledge to some of the special features of self-interpretation that have attracted attention elsewhere in philosophy.

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this basic concept of immediacy is itself not wholly free of controversy, of course, but the perceptual model of "introspective" or "first-person" access is an additional substantive thesis, which, while not without its contemporary defenders, has been subject to sustained criticism in this past century. at the very least, the burden of proof would be on someone who claims that we must adopt a perceptual model if we are to see self-knowledge as involving a cognitive achievement at all. by marking “authority and estrangement: an essay on self-knowledge” as want to read:Error rating book. for any definition of this latter kind clearly makes it impossible to conceive of self-knowledge as both "substantial" but not conforming to the picture of "inner observation. full text of our books:Authority and estrangement:an essay on self-knowledgerichard moranpaperback | 2001 | . in authority and estrangement, richard moran argues for a reconception of the first-person and its claims. the normal importance of self-knowledge in a person's life will have to be understood as dependent on the level of description provided by the concepts of ordinary "folkish" psychological discourse. by way of setting up the case for the deflationary analysis, boghossian describes the options for the understanding of self-knowledge as exhausted by three possibilities: such knowledge is either based on inference, or by a kind of looking, or else it is based on nothing (p. in the case of knowledge of oneself, it is particularly clear that the judgments that may be immediate in this sense concern a subject matter (i. nothing in the analysis itself given here explains why there should be any difference at all in the application conditions of psychological concepts in first-person and third-person contexts. a theme throughout the book will be that the difficulties in properly characterizing the first-person position are not merely epistemological ones, and later chapters will take up the theme of characterizing first-person relations that are not based on third-person models and do not involve essentially alienated relations to the self. my hope is to provide the terms for a more detailed and realistic picture of the ordinary failures as well as successes of self-knowledge, and why some of the characteristic failures should matter in any special way to the health of the person. since the following chapters will be developing an account of self-other asymmetries that takes them to be essential to the nature of persons generally, i want first to investigate the prior question of whether admitting some conceptual basis to first-person authority undermines the assumption of first-person reports as involving genuine cognitive achievements.

) we apply the term 'conscious' to the belief itself for reasons related to why we may apply this term to certain activities of the person, where this qualifies the activity in ways that do not obtain with respect to anyone else's awareness of it. how could a skeptical conclusion about our knowledge of our own thoughts come to seem unavoidable? recent philosophy typically rejects the picture of the mind as immediately transparent to itself, and then tacitly takes this rejection to be equivalent to rejecting the very idea of introspective access, thereby ceding the very concept of first-person awareness to its cartesian interpretation. have seen how natural it is to think that if self-knowledge is something.:"authority and estrangement is simply one of the most striking and original books in the philosophy of mind written in the last ten years. consequently, it can definitely inspire further philosophical considerations concerning the self. boghossian himself is clear that he does not mean to endorse skepticism about self-knowledge, but he does nonetheless take the difficulties presented by the assumption of externalism to be quite real ones. a person can make reliable psychological ascriptions to himself immediately, without needing to observe what he says and does. what this assumption most directly opposes itself to is the idea that belief and the like are intrinsically identifiable phenomenal states, a view that has few adherents today. the important point is that these are taken to be genuine judgments, expressive of knowledge, which are made without reliance on "external" observation. what i mean by the concentration on the theoretical has only been sketchily indicated so far and will become clearer by consideration of a final representative account of self-consciousness that most explicitly declares its allegiance to this picture. in authority and estrangement, richard moran argues for a reconception of the first-person and its claims. the perceptual model has problems quite independently of these concerns, however, and it is crucial that we keep the distinction clear and do not take the substantiality of self-knowledge itself to be identified with a particular intuitive model of it.

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