Essay services



List of approved essay services

Bruton v london quadrant housing trust essay

Critical Evaluation of Bruton v London & Quadrant Housing Trust

borough council who had granted a licence to london & quadrant. – lewisham borough council v roberts ca ([1949] 2 kb 608) the council sought to exercise its powers under the act to take possession of part of the defendant’s property. there is nothing to suggest that he was to share possession with the trust, the council or anyone else. only doubt i have had is as to whether, as street v. it remains to consider whether notwithstanding the apparent grant of a tenancy there exist special circumstances which are capable of negativing this result (street v. it is true that he said the crown could not "grant a lease" and this could be read to mean that the absence of a legal estate prevented the crown from entering into the relationship of landlord and tenant. 779, where, as i have said, the facts were very similar to those in the present case, on the ground that "the fact that the grantor had no title was not referred to in argument or the judgments. it is simply a question of characterising the terms which the parties have agreed.. may have been misled by the ancient phrase "tenancy by estoppel" into thinking that it described an agreement which would not otherwise be a lease or tenancy but which was treated as being one by virtue of an estoppel. 793 observed in relation to the argument as to existence of special circumstances:"the argument which we have heard suggests to me that, whatever their wishes or intentions, it may at least be difficult for bodies charged with responsibilities for the housing of the homeless to enter into any arrangement pursuant to section 65(2) of the housing act 1985 under which the person housed is to enjoy exclusive occupation of premises, however temporarily, without conferring on that person security of tenure by virtue of the act. 793 rejected the argument that there existed special circumstances whereby the defendant, albeit in exclusive possession of the premises, was not a tenant. if it was a breach of a term of the licence from the council, that would have been because it was a tenancy."the creation of rights in property by the effluxion of time" in e cooke, modern studies in property law, volume iv (2007) (hart publishing) (ed), pp. the development of the non-proprietary lease through an examination of case law.

Bruton v London and Quadrant Housing Trust

mountford contemplated to be possible, this prima facie conclusion is displaced by other relevant factors, what in street v. with the housing trust has the legal effect of creating a. » housing » landlord and tenant » bruton v london and quadrant housing trust: hl 24 jun 1999. a not unreasonable intention given that the trust's only interest in the subject was that of a licensee. these are the reasons for the misgivings expressed at the start of this judgment. to create a tenancy since it conferred exclusive possession for a. i agree with it, and for the reasons which he has given i too would allow the appeal. the agreement was an agreement to give mr bruton the exclusive possession of the flat for a period or periods of time in return for the periodic payment of money; the grant of exclusive possession was not referable to any other relationship between the parties. for these reasons i consider that the agreement between the trust and mr.., who appeared for the trust, submitted that there were "special circumstances" in this case which enabled one to construe the agreement as a licence despite the presence of all the characteristics identified in street v. my opinion none of these circumstances can make an agreement to grant exclusive possession something other than a tenancy. the tenancy, being of a mutual housing co-operative did not have security but was in a form restricting the landlord’s right to recover possession, and the tenant resisted saying that it was . the character of the landlord is irrelevant because although the rent acts and other landlord and tenant acts do make distinctions between different kinds of landlords, it is not by saying that what would be a tenancy if granted by one landlord will be something else if granted by another. – minister of agriculture and fisheries v matthews ([1950] 1 kb 148) under the act, it would be ultra vires the crown’s powers to grant a tenancy of property it had requisitioned.

Sap sd functional consultant resume

Bruton v London and Quadrant Housing Trust: HL 24 Jun 1999

on 27 march 1986 it entered into an agreement with the trust by which it permitted the trust to use the premises in furtherance of its charitable housing objects. for the housing trust accepted before your lordships that a contractual relationship of landlord and tenant suffices to make the provisions of the act applicable."knowing receipt and registered land" in c mitchell, constructive and resulting trusts (2010) (hart publishing) (ed), pp. the decision of your lordships' house in westminster city council v. – westminster city council v clarke hl (gazette 29-apr-92, [1992] ac 288, [1992] 24 hlr 360, bailii, [1992] ukhl 11, [1992] 1 all er 695) an occupant of a hostel for homeless and vulnerable single men had only a licence to occupy the room, and was not a tenant. but it cannot grant a lease or create any legal interest in the land in favour of any other person, because it has itself no estate in the land out of which to carve any interest. however, the issue in this appeal is whether that professed intention was achieved or whether the legal consequences of the agreement amounted to a tenancy bringing into operation section 11 of the landlord and tenant act 1985. in any case, the crown in that case could not have validly entered into such a relationship because it would have been ultra vires its statutory powers under the emergency powers (defence) act 1939: see minister of agriculture and fisheries v.. 288, it is clear that the agreement gives a right to exclusive possession and prima facie is a tenancy. the owner of the goods sued for damages, claiming that the bank had no right to levy distress because that ancient common law remedy was available only to the holder of a legal estate. nor in my view can they be used by a landlord to avoid being estopped from denying that he entered into the agreement he actually made. – reardon smith line ltd v yngvar hansen-tangen (the ‘diana prosperity’) hl ([1976] 1 wlr 989, [1976] 2 lloyd’s rep 621, [1976] 3 all er 570) in construing a contract, three principles can be found.. 809 is authority for the proposition that a "lease" or "tenancy" is a contractually binding agreement, not referable to any other relationship between the parties, by which one person gives another the right to exclusive occupation of land for a fixed or renewable period or periods of time, usually in return for a periodic payment in money. but the parties cannot contract out of the rent acts or other landlord and tenant statutes by such devices.

The distinction between leases and licences | Law Teacher

Miss Amy Goymour | Faculty of Law

a tenancy rather than a licence and that the trust was in breach of its implied. the trust's use of the subjects was accordingly in the capacity of licensees.. was focusing on the question of whether the crown could create a legal interest in the land which would be binding upon third parties and said, correctly, that the crown could not create such an interest without having an estate of its own."property and housing" in d hoffman, the impact of the human rights act on private law in england and wales (2011) (cup) (ed), pp. this was a device commonly used in old mortgages to give the mortgagee the rights of a landlord: a speedier procedure for recovery of possession which was then available and the right to levy distress upon goods and chattels on the mortgaged premises. this case, it seems to me that the agreement, construed against the relevant background, plainly gave mr. the case of mr bruton depends upon his establishing that his agreement with the housing trust has the legal effect of creating a relationship of tenant and landlord between them. it is the legal consequences of the agreement which is determinative rather than the label which parties have chosen to attach to it. you understand and agree that while you are living in the property, you will allow access at all times during normal working hours to the staff of the trust, the owners and agents for all purposes connected with the work of the trust. the breach of contract alleged against the defendant housing trust is the failure to maintain and keep in repair the flat in which the plaintiff, mr bruton is living. the answer to this question is, in my judgment, determined by the decision in street v. the trust's lack of title is also irrelevant, but i shall consider this point at a later stage. this seems to me to fly in the face of street v. summers ‘certainty in the terms of leasehold demises: recent consideration in berrisford v mexfield housing co-operative ltd’ wltb 2012 1(feb) 1 - 3.

Slumdog millionaire resume dansk

Oxford University Press | Online Resource Centre | Further reading

email service will alert you when new material is added to this online resource centre. review of e burn and j cartwright (eds), cheshire and burn’s law of real property [2007] 71 conv 391..'s misgivings for the reasons he states and sir brian neill's regrets. secondly, what is admissible as a matter of the rules of evidence under this heading is what is arguably relevant, but admissibility is not decisive." the surrounding circumstances relied on here spring from the essential function of the housing trust in providing accommodation for the homeless and to that end to maintain a stock of housing over which it has maximum control, which a licence rather than a tenancy might be more likely to give.. 809 this house decided that where residential accommodation is granted for a term, at a rent with exclusive possession, the landlord providing neither attention nor services, the grant is a tenancy notwithstanding the fact that the agreement professes an intention by both parties to create a mere licence. have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend lord hoffmann in which he has referred to the facts, the statutory provisions and the relevant authorities., for the reasons given by lord hoffmann, i agree that this appeal could be allowed. – morton v woods qbd ((1867) lr 4 qb 292) the owner of a factory, having already conveyed his legal estate by virtue of a first charge, purported to grant a second mortgage to a bank. from – bruton v london and quadrant housing trust ca (times 14-aug-97, bailii, [1997] ewca civ 2255) a person with no sufficient title to land cannot create a tenancy of the land which would be binding by an estoppel if that tenancy would exclude his own possible claim for possession. the only concept of estoppel which was possibly relevant was that which arises from the agreement. it would be different if it could be shown that the housing trust had no capacity to make the agreement. respondents are a charitable housing trust one of whose purposes is to provide short term accommodation for the homeless. flat is in a block belonging to the london borough of lambeth ("the council").

Swat team cover letter

House of Lords - Bruton (A.P.) v. London and Quadrant Housing Trust

but mr bruton alleges that the agreement creates a relationship of landlord and tenant between the housing trust and himself and that therefore an undertaking to repair by the housing trust is compulsorily implied by statute - section 11 of the landlord and tenant act 1985.. argued that the fact that the trust was a responsible charitable organisation performing important social functions and that it was merely a licensee of the subjects, inhibited by the terms of that licence from granting tenancies, amounted to such special circumstances. – berrisford v mexfield housing co-operative ltd sc ([2011] npc 115, [2011] 46 eg 105, [2011] 3 wlr 1091, bailii, [2011] uksc 32, bailii summary, uksc 2010/0167, sc summary, sc, [2012] 1 ac 955, [2012] ptsr 69, [2011] 3 eglr 115, [2012] l & tr 7, [2012] 1 p & cr 8, [2012] 1 all er 1393, [2012] hlr 15) the tenant appealed against an order granting possession. he needed to do no more than rely upon the written agreement he had with the housing trust and its legal effect. at how the law distinguishes between a lease and a licence and whether the decision in bruton v london & quadrant housing trust [2000] has blurred that distinction. bruton read as follows:"occupation of short-life accommodation at 2 oval house, rushcroft road, sw2 on a temporary basis. the meaning of the agreement, for example, as to the extent of the possession which it grants, depend upon the intention of the parties, objectively ascertained by reference to the language and relevant background. have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech which has been prepared by my noble and learned friend lord hoffmann. the trust is a charitable housing trust which, among other things, provides short-term accommodation for the homeless and others in need of housing. hoffmann said that an agreement can give rise to a tenancy even if it does not create ‘an estate or other proprietary interest which may be binding upon third parties statutes: landlord and tenant act 1988 this case cites:Cited – street v mountford hl ([1985] 1 eglr 128, [1985] 2 all er 289, [1985] 2 wlr 877, [1985] ac 809, [1985] ukhl 4, bailii) the document signed by the occupier stated that she understood that she had been given a licence, and that she understood that she had not been granted a tenancy protected under the rent acts. review of a burrows and lord rodger (eds), mapping the law: essays in memory of peter birks (2007) 18 klj 371.. mr bruton claimed that his agreement with the trust was in the nature. it would therefore have been ultra vires for the council to have granted the trust any estate or other proprietary interest in the premises."to permit the trust or its agents, surveyors or consultants to enter the property for the purpose of inspecting the state of repair and cleanliness of the property or any purpose connected at all reasonable hours of the day.

The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer No 1 2009

the trust has the property on licence from [the council] who acquired the property for development. 31 january 1989 the trust entered into an agreement with the appellant which stated that occupation of a flat in the block was being offered to him on a weekly license from 6 february 1989 and that the trust had the property on license from the council. bruton brought proceedings in the lambeth county court to enforce the implied covenants, it served a notice to quit and claimed a declaration that mr. an agreement having these characteristics creates a relationship of landlord and tenant to which the common law or statute may then attach various incidents. in this case the trust granted exclusive possession to the appellant, a fact which is fortified rather than detracted from by the reservation of rights of access by the trust and the council for limited purposes (street v. but the mortgagor had no legal estate, having conveyed it to the first mortgagee, and therefore could not confer one upon the second mortgagee. it is not disputed that by reason of section 32(3) of the housing act 1985 the council would have had no power to make such a grant." in my opinion this is easily explained by the fact that the grantor's title or lack of title was irrelevant to the issue in the case. it is not whether either party is entitled to deny some obligation or incident of the tenancy on the ground that the trust had no title. it considers statutory intervention on the regulation of landlord and tenant relationships – the differences between the residential and commercial sectors. the housing trust had the requisite capacity to make the agreement with mr bruton (as for that matter had the council--section 44(1) of the housing act 1985). and pending this development, it is being used to provide temporary housing accommodation. 779 was correct although i share his anxiety about the impact of such a result on the housing trust. review of edelman and degeling (eds), unjust enrichment in commercial law (2009) 125 lqr 699.

Publications | Cambridge Private Law Centre

. 288 is a good example of the importance of background in deciding whether the agreement grants exclusive possession or not."as has been explained to you, the above property is being offered to you by [the trust] on a weekly licence from 6 february 1989.. 809, 818, such an express reservation "only serves to emphasise the fact that the grantee is entitled to exclusive possession and is a tenant. bruton claims that the trust is in breach of the implied repairing obligations contained in section 11 of the landlord and tenant act 1985. how the house of lords in the decision of bruton v london & quadrant housing trust [2000] was able to hold that a lease exists when the head occupier had no estate to give to his sub occupier. but this cannot contradict what was actually agreed between the housing trust and mr bruton or its legal effect as between them." section 36(1) provides that "lease" and "tenancy" are to have the same meaning. it is offered to you on the condition that you will vacate upon receiving reasonable notice from the trust, which will not normally be less than four weeks.. 292, a factory owner granted a second mortgage to a bank to secure advances. he occupies the flat under an agreement dated 31 january 1989 with the london and quadrant housing trust ("the trust"). agree that this appeal should be allowed as proposed by my noble and learned friend lord hoffmann and for the reasons which he has given. the trust did not retain such control over the premises as was inconsistent with mr. i am not sure that this result will necessarily inure to the benefit of the class of homeless persons in this country viewed as a whole. p hinojosa ‘on property, leases, licences, horses and carts: revisiting bruton v london & quadrant housing trust’ conv.

Critical Evaluation of Bruton v London & Quadrant Housing Trust

Landmark Cases in Property Law (Landmark Cases) Simon

this notwithstanding the fact that the trust had only a limited interest in the subjects. the fact that the parties use language more appropriate to a different kind of agreement, such as a licence, is irrelevant if upon its true construction it has the identifying characteristics of a lease. – family association v jones ca ([1990] 1 wlr 779) the association as licensee of a local authority granted what was described as a licence to the defendant to occupy premises on a temporary basis. the written agreement does not contain any undertaking by the housing trust to repair the flat. the licence could not have turned it into something else. relevant question is simply one of ascertaining the effect in law of the agreement which the parties made., i cannot agree that there is no inconsistency between what the trust purported to do and its denial of the existence of a tenancy. after hearing evidence he declared that he was a licensee. he relies upon a written agreement between himself and the housing trust dated 31 january 1989. it follows that the relationship created was that of landlord and tenant and the provisions of the act apply to the agreement. in the absence of any exceptional circumstances it follows that the agreement between the trust and the appellant constituted a tenancy to which section 11 of the landlord and tenant act 1985 applied and that the appeal should be allowed. bruton having exclusive possession, as was the case in westminster city council v. 779, where the facts were very similar to those in the present case, the court of appeal construed the "licence" as a tenancy. it is not necessary for him to show that the council had conveyed a legal estate to the housing trust.

but an estoppel depended upon the grantor having purported to grant a lease and in this case the trust had not done so. it acquired the block in 1975 for housing purposes by the use of compulsory powers contained in provisions which have now been consolidated in part ii (provision of housing accommodation) of the housing act 1985. when the borrower failed to pay, the bank levied a distress. review of a clarke and p kohler, property law: commentary and materials [2007] clj 233. 779, where the facts were very similar to those in this case, the association as licensee of a local authority granted what was described as a licence to the defendant to occupy premises on a temporary basis. review of h dagan, ethics and the law of restitution [2006] clj 456. trust which permitted the trust to provide accommodation to homeless."the result must be substantially to reduce the choice of methods available to bodies such as the housing association for dealing with their always limited supplies of housing stock. the only rights which it reserved were for itself and the council to enter at certain times and for limited purposes. held: the housing association had a temporary licence to occupy a house and to re-let it, but under conditions which were more consistent with a tenancy rather than a licence. his dissenting judgment in the court of appeal in this case sir brian neill expressed his regret at his inability to distinguish family housing association v.. gave careful consideration to whether any exceptional ground existed for making an exception to the principle in street v. exclusive possession for repeated periods of time created a tenancy. in my opinion, the trust plainly did purport to grant a tenancy.

the trust has the use of a block of flats owned by lambeth borough council pursuant to a license agreement with that council of 27 march 1986 which provided that no grant of an estate or other proprietary interest was thereby conferred and that the subjects should be used to provide temporary accommodation for homeless persons. bruton's agreement is irrelevant because one cannot contract out of the statute. in the present case, it is correct that both parties knew that the housing trust was a mere licensee of the council and, in so far as they may have thought about it, should have realised that for the housing trust to grant mr bruton the exclusive possession of the flat probably amounted to a breach of the housing trust's obligations to the council. section 13 provides that these are to apply to "a lease of a dwelling house granted on or after october 1961 for a term of less than seven years. the basis of the estoppel is that having entered into an agreement which constitutes a lease or tenancy, he cannot repudiate that incident or obligation. it is the fact that the agreement between the parties constitutes a tenancy that gives rise to an estoppel and not the other way round."testing the boundaries of conversion - account-holders, intangible property and economic harm'" [2012] lmclq 204. the present case does not depend upon the establishing of an estoppel nor does any problem arise from the fact that the housing trust did not have a legal estate. beware: residents gain rights to drive over common land [2005] clj 39. bruton had agreed that he was not to have a tenancy and the trust had no estate out of which it could grant one.(this list may be incomplete) this case is cited by:Cited – kay, gorman, etc v london borough of lambeth, london and quadrant housing trust ca ([2004] ewca civ 926, bailii, times 26-jul-04, [2005] qb 352, [2004] 3 wlr 1396) the defendant local authority had licenced houses to a housing trust, which in turn granted sub-licences to the claimants who were applicants for housing under homelessness provisions, and who now asserted that they became secure tenants of the ."bruton v london & quadrant housing trust: relativity of title, and the regulation of the ‘proprietary underworld’" in douglas, hickey and waring, landmark cases in property law (hart) (ed), pp. a discussion of the requirement of certainty of term in a leasehold estate in the light of the berrisford v mexfield decision. i need not condescend further on the relevant terms of the agreement which have been fully set out in the speech by my noble and learned friend lord hoffmann.

Text response essay introduction

How it works

STEP 1 Submit your order

STEP 2 Pay

STEP 3 Approve preview

STEP 4 Download

Why These Services?









For security reasons we do not
store any credit card information.