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Democracy promotion and american foreign policy a review essay

Democracy Promotion and American Foreign Policy: A Review Essay

Review – US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion

, the origin and prevention of major wars (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1989), p. zakaria cites hong kong under british rule as an example, but this experience of a liberal imperial power engaging in a rather benign authoritarian rule over a flourishing free-market economy has already ended and is unlikely to be repeated. second, some asians argue that the spread democracy would aggravate ethnic tensions and increase ethnic conflict within asian countries. he reports that between 1900 and 1987 over 169 million people died in democides, compared to about 34 million battle death in wars. these critics assume that alliance formation proceeds in strict accordance with realist logic and that regime type plays no role. mansfield and snyder identify several useful policies to mitigate any potential risks of democratization.. absence of consensus on what explains the democratic peacethe argument: the first, and most general criticism of the deductive logic of the democratic peace proposition holds that the lack of agreement on what causes democracies to avoid war with one another calls the proposition into question. russett and maoz find that the normative model is more powerful. among the many observers and political scientists who make this point is samuel huntington, who argues that america's "identity as a nation is inseparable from its commitment to liberal and democratic values. beitz, political theory and international relations (princeton: princeton university press, 1979), and stanley hoffmann, duties beyond borders: on the limits and possibilities of ethical international politics (syracuse: syracuse university press, 1981).. security and economic interests would be advanced in a world of democracies., the origin and prevention of major wars (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1989), p."18 in the 19th century britain embraced liberal principles before it extended the franchise and became a democracy. 121: mansfield and snyder, "democratization and the danger of war," p. zakaria cites hong kong under british rule as an example, but this experience of a liberal imperial power engaging in a rather benign authoritarian rule over a flourishing free-market economy has already ended and is unlikely to be repeated. 27-71; and rummel, "democracies are less warlike than other regimes," european journal of international relations, vol.: mansfield and snyder have advanced an important new argument, but even if partially true, it does not refute the case for spreading democracy internationally. is an important variable in the understanding the composition of alliances . canada and most european countries demonstrate that liberal democracy does not cause social collapse. they frequently cite the war of 1812, the spanish-american war, finland's decision to align with germany against the western powers and the soviet union during world war two, the american civil war, world war one, and the wars that followed the disintegration of yugoslavia in the 1990s. given its founding principles and very identity, the united states has a large stake in advancing its core value of liberty. 109: see layne, "kant or cant," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds. democracy is not an unalloyed good and the united states should not blindly attempt to spread democracy to the exclusion of all other goals, but u., the tendency of democracies to ally with one another is further evidence of the special characteristics of democratic foreign policy. economic and financial crises that swept across many asian countries in 1997 and 1998 have muted many of the loudest voices that argued for "asian values" and "soft authoritarianism. siverson and juliann emmons, "birds of a feather," journal of conflict resolution, vol. russett and maoz find that the normative model is more powerful.- belfer center for science and international affairs, harvard kennedy school quarterly journal: international security. 112: see owen, "how liberalism causes democratic peace"; and owen, liberal peace, liberal war: american politics and international security (ithaca, n. matthews, iii, "current gains and future outcomes: when cumulative relative gains matter," international security, vol. for example, if we look at carter’s years (121-137), carter’s commitment to a more ethical foreign policy, focused on restoring us international prestige after the intervention in vietnam through supporting the respect of human rights, seemed to be evident, but he was forced to underplay this approach in order to cope with international backlash against us interests (such as the revolutions in nicaragua and iran). new democracies also need external assistance to build up the journalistic infrastructure that will support a "marketplace of ideas" that can prevent manipulation of public opinion and nationalistic mythmaking. is an important variable in the understanding the composition of alliances . it often will be difficult for the united states and other actors to help countries to become democracies, but international efforts frequently can make a difference. third argument's assertion that democratic government is incompatible with east asian values is belied by the relatively successful growth of democracy in japan, south korea, and, more recently, taiwan and the philippines. 22: for definitions of liberty and classic discussions of the topic, see the writings of immanuel kant, john locke, john stuart mill, and the federalist papers."note 99: see, for example, bruce russett, "the democratic peace: and yet it moves," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds. for a reconsideration of the claim that democracies are as war-prone as other types of states, see james lee ray, democracy and international conflict: an evaluation of the democratic peace proposition (columbia: university of south carolina press, 1995), pp. case of india before and after independence provides further evidence that democratic rule is a key factor in preventing famines.. institutional/structural explanationsinstitutional/structural explanations for the democratic peace contend that democratic decision-making procedures and institutional constraints prevent democracies from waging war on one another. the absence of democracy tends to lead to internal conflicts, ethnic strife, political oppression, and rapid population growth-all of which encourage the flight of refugees. the americas," the annals of the american academy of political. for example, tracing the process of how events unfolded should reveal that the publics in democracies did not want war with other democracies, that leaders did not make military threats against other democracies, and that democracies adopted accommodating behavior toward other democracies. 617-648; zeev maoz and nasrin abdolali, "regime type and international conflict," journal of conflict resolution, vol. economic and financial crises that swept across many asian countries in 1997 and 1998 have muted many of the loudest voices that argued for "asian values" and "soft authoritarianism. in light of the absence of democratic and liberal traditions in many new democracies (particularly in the former soviet union and africa), it is remarkable that freedom continues to flourish to the extent that it does."13 samuel huntington recognizes that democracy "implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns. mansfield and snyder themselves point out that "reversals of democratization are nearly as risky as democratization itself," thereby bolstering the case for assisting the consolidation of new democracies. for the argument that population growth is higher in authoritarian regimes, regardless of their level of wealth, see adam przeworski and fernando limongi, "democracy and development," paper presented to the nobel symposium on democracy's victory and crisis, uppsala university, sweden, august 27-30, 1994, pp. these arguments do not rest on an assessment of the empirical evidence, but instead rely on analyses and critiques of the internal consistency and persuasiveness of the theoretical explanations of the democratic peace. 57: for one of the earliest statements of this finding, see melvin small and j. 36: see gerald segal, china changes shape: regionalism and foreign policy, adelphi paper no. policies that advance liberalism are harder to develop and pursue than those that aim to persuade states to hold free and fair elections, but the united states can promote liberalism as well as electoral democracy, as i argue below. in south africa, haiti, and chile, for example, elections removed antidemocratic rulers and advanced the process of democratization., democracies are able to recognize and respond to states that are making a transition from democracy to authoritarianism. arguments suggest that zakaria, kaplan, and other critics of electoral democracy have taken the valid point that "elections are not enough" too far.. promoting elections may be harmful or irrelevantthe arguments: one of the most prominent recent criticisms of attempts to promote democracy claims that democratic elections often have few positive effects, especially in countries that do not have liberal societies or other socioeconomic conditions such as a large middle class and a high level of economic development. norms of trust and respect for the autonomy of liberal regimes would rule out such behavior, just as they proscribe war. kong on the move: 10 years as the hksar (washington,Center for strategic and international studies, 2008), pp:3-17. nevertheless, it seems likely that proponents of "asian values" will offer a less strident challenge to liberal and democratic values in the future and that asian countries will pursue political liberalization as part of their economic reforms. democracies are more likely to adopt market economies, so democracies will tend to have more prosperous and open economies. democratic revolution:Struggles for freedom and pluralism in the developing world (new., neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate (new york: columbia university press, 1993). john owen has conducted such tests and finds considerable evidence to support the democratic-peace proposition. instead, contemporary trade agreements are mostly about harmonizing labor, regulatory, environmental, and copyright standards across many different societies, precisely for the purpose of creating fairer competition between states. some democracies, including india and the philippines, have languished economically, at least until the last few years. ward and gleditsch find that democratization reduces the probability of war by about 50%., america should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments.

Review – US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion

Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion on JSTOR

"10 the plethora of definitions of democracy has stimulated many scholars to analyze and compare how the term is defined. this school of thought argues that countries should be ruled by a wise and authoritarian elite, that individual rights often need to be limited for the sake of the broader community, and that the state should play a leading role in economic development. it argues that the united states should promote democracy and refutes some of the most important arguments against u. in central and eastern europe, for example, bulgaria, the czech republic, estonia, hungary, latvia, lithuania, poland, romania, slovakia, and slovenia have avoided major internal and external conflicts. because the virtues of democracy are taken for granted, they are rarely fully enumerated and considered. two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization and economic performance. pursuing the certainly difficult task of giving an overview of us democracy promotion, this book is divided into different sections that cover different american presidencies, from t. the political philosopher michael walzer makes this point: "even in the absence of free elections, it is possible to have a free press, religious freedom, associational pluralism, the right to organize unions, the right to move freely, and so on. these conditions are likely to be met when an impartial court system exists and can require individuals to enforce contracts. in particular, autocracies are likely to exploit nationalism and manipulate public opinion to launch diversionary wars-the same causal mechanisms that mansfield and snyder claim are at work in democratizing states.'"21third, improvements in the lives of individuals in other countries matter to americans because the united states cannot insulate itself from the world. he reports that between 1900 and 1987 over 169 million people died in democides, compared to about 34 million battle death in wars. elections alone do not guarantee that constitutional liberalism and the rule of law will be adopted, but they do focus the attention of the voting public on the process of freely electing their governments. the relative-gains argument holds that in international politics, cooperation is rare because it often gives greater gains to one state, and these relative disparities in gains can be turned into advantages in power than can be used to threaten the state that gains less. thus evidence that democracies are sensitive to power and interest does not refute the democratic-peace proposition. 19: many political and moral philosophers have addressed this issue and it would be impossible to do full justice to their arguments in this essay. 4: see robert kagan, "democracies and double standards," commentary, august 1997, pp. 119: mansfield and snyder, "democratization and the danger of war," pp. such tests would also compare pairs of democratic states to mixed and nondemocratic pairs. are voluntary and not required to download the e-book - your link to download is below. other analyses have concluded that the influence of other variables, including geographical proximity and wealth, do not detract from the significance of the finding that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another., the existence of a free press and the free flow of information in democracies prevents famine by serving as an early warning system on the effects of natural catastrophes such as floods and droughts that may cause food scarcities. the american and british bombing campaigns against germany and japan, u. such tests would also compare pairs of democratic states to mixed and nondemocratic pairs. for discussions of liberty and liberalism, see "liberalism defined: the perils of complacency," the economist, december 21, 1996; isaiah berlin, "two concepts of liberty," in berlin, four essays on liberalism (london: oxford university press, 1969); michael doyle, "liberalism and world politics," american political science review, vol. this section enumerates how the spread of democracy will improve the lives of the citizens of new democracies, contribute to international peace, and directly advance the national interests of the united states. old elites that are threatened by democratization can be given "golden parachutes" that enable them to at least retain some of their wealth and to stay out of jail. but whether states have fewer civil liberties than political rights is a problematic way to distinguish between liberal and illiberal democracies. promoting democracy makes more sense than this course, because the risks of democratization are not so high and uncontrollable that we should give up on attempts to spread democracy. 61: for examples of institutional/structural arguments, see bruce bueno de mesquita and david lalman, war and reason: domestic and institutional imperatives (new haven: yale university press, 1992); t. plattner (boulder, co: lynne rienner publishers,Democracy in east asia,Edited with marc f. and new york: routledge, routledge studies in us foreign policy, 2013. such claims are implicit in some critiques of the logic and evidence, but not all such critiques identify the factors that are alleged to count for the absence of wars between democracies. countries such as mongolia and south africa appear to have made the transition to democracy without going to war."13 samuel huntington recognizes that democracy "implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns.. combining normative and structural explanationssome studies have attempted to test the relative power of the normative and institutional/structural explanations of the democratic peace. earlier historical examples of liberal nondemocracies include britain in the early 19th century, and possibly other european constitutional monarchies of that century. this absence-or near absence, depending on the definitions of "war" and "democracy" used-has been called "one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations. farber and joanne gowa, "polities and peace," in michael e."14these attempts to expand the criteria for democracy reveal that it makes more sense to talk about degrees of democracy instead of neatly dividing states into democracies and nondemocracies. mansfield and snyder recognize that "it is probably true that a world where more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the united states. wars usually come out of mids, which create the opportunity for leaders to play nationalist cards and to otherwise behave and mansfield and snyder fear. considerable evidence indicates that liberal democracy, with its emphasis on tolerance, cooperation, political accommodation, and respect for civil liberties, provides the best recipe for long-term domestic stability. in other cases, including many infectious and chronic diseases, the precise biological and physiological processes that cause death are not fully understood. first, western democracy allows for too much liberty, and this excessive individual freedom causes moral decline and social collapse. maoz and russett focused on the "politically-relevant" dyads, which account for most wars. the same court system, independent judiciary, and respect for law and individual rights that are needed for a lasting democracy are also required for security of property and contract rights. john owen has conducted such tests and finds considerable evidence to support the democratic-peace proposition. however, with a more closed look, the structure of the book clearly reveals the author’s attraction for the “analytic eclecticism” (sil & katzenstein 2010: 19–22; kurki 2008: 285), which has also been recently used by democracy promotion scholars. as sen points out, "the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize" and "the effectiveness of democracy in the prevention of famine has tended to depend on the politicization of the plight of famine victims, through the process of public discussion, which generates political solidarity. 33: mancur olson, "dictatorship, democracy, and development," american political science review, vol. the absence of democracy tends to lead to internal conflicts, ethnic strife, political oppression, and rapid population growth-all of which encourage the flight of refugees. the carnegie council for international peace and the institute for. spreading democracy also will directly advance the national interests of the united states, because democracies will not launch wars or terrorist attacks against the united states, will not produce refugees seeking asylum in the united states, and will tend to ally with the united states. to define democracy are further complicated by the differences between the democracy of ancient greece and contemporary democracy. although this claim has been most closely identified with sen, other scholars who have studied famines and hunger reach similar conclusions. policies that advance liberalism are harder to develop and pursue than those that aim to persuade states to hold free and fair elections, but the united states can promote liberalism as well as electoral democracy, as i argue below. 27-71; and rummel, "democracies are less warlike than other regimes," european journal of international relations, vol., nationalism, ethnic conflict, and democracy (baltimore: johns hopkins university press, 1994. the logic of the theory, however, can be recast in terms of checks and balances. the same court system, independent judiciary, and respect for law and individual rights that are needed for a lasting democracy are also required for security of property and contract rights. east asians view democracy,Edited with yun-han chu, andrew nathan, and doh chull shin (new york:Columbia university press, 2008). democracies, however, may have found themselves allied to one another against nondemocracies because they share a commitment to democratic values and want to defend them against threats from nondemocracies. the more freely a political elite can control the power of the state apparatus, the more thoroughly it can repress and murder its subjects. 24-41; and yoichi funabashi, "the asianization of asia," foreign affairs, vol. achieving this goal is worth the risk that some distasteful leaders will win elections and use these victories at the ballot box to legitimize their illiberal rule. critics of the democratic peace have presented vigorous arguments that have forced the proposition's proponents to refine and qualify the case for the democratic peace. shouldn't this country focus on its own problems and interests?

The Backyard Effects in Democracy Promotion: Evidence from a

ward and gleditsch find that democratization reduces the probability of war by about 50%. as marc plattner and carl gershman of the national endowment for democracy point out, none of the examples is a "practical vision" for the 21st century. countries such as mongolia and south africa appear to have made the transition to democracy without going to war. to define democracy are further complicated by the differences between the democracy of ancient greece and contemporary democracy. 138: i attempt to answer these questions in my contribution to christopher layne and sean m.- belfer center for science and international affairs, harvard kennedy school., democracy and peace: a more skeptical view," journal of peace research, vol. rummel finds that democracies-by which he means liberal democracies-between 1900 and 1987 saw only 0. the rights-based case for liberty, on the other hand, does not focus on the consequences of increased liberty, but instead argues that all men and women, by virtue of their common humanity, have a right to freedom. the heritage foundation has constructed an index of economic freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. in a world where the use of force remains possible, no government can afford to pursue a foreign policy based on altruism.. leadership in science and technology; for culture and the arts; and, yes, for american business, which depends on government services far more heavily than is generally recognized. and democracies provide better climates for american overseas investment, by virtue of their political stability and market economies. in 65% of the states classified as illiberal democracies by zakaria, the difference between civil liberties and political rights is only one point on the 7-point freedom house scale. the global spread of democracy is likely to bring greater individual liberty to more and more people. it assumes that states must base their foreign policies almost entirely on worst-case scenarios. beitz, political theory and international relations (princeton: princeton university press, 1979), and stanley hoffmann, duties beyond borders: on the limits and possibilities of ethical international politics (syracuse: syracuse university press, 1981). liberalism is most closely associated with the political thought of john locke and john stuart mill, although thomas hobbes and adam smith also contributed to its development. 19-26 for the argument that the clinton administration is showing less enthusiasm for promoting democracy, and for a summary and critique of recent arguments against promoting democracy. by the late 1990s, proponents and critics of the democratic peace were engaged in a vigorous and sometimes heated debate. in a democracy, the executive branch, legislative branch, and the public all constrain each other's ability to make rash and hasty decisions for war. democracy:Toward consolidation (baltimore: johns hopkins university press,In the 1990s: actors and instruments, issues and imperatives. bruce russett argues: "if another nation's leaders regard a state as democratic, they will anticipate a difficult and lengthy process before the democracy is likely to use significant military force against them. to the extent that americans care about citizens of other countries and international peace, they will see benefits from the continued spread of democracy. 179, and christopher layne, "lord palmerston and the triumph of realism: anglo-french relations, 1830-48," in elman, ed. 16: although the term "liberal" has become an epithet hurled at those on the left of the american political spectrum, virtually all american politicians and most of those in europe embrace the basic principles of liberalism. and the perpetrator of the alleged "state terrorist" acts in each case was the united states itself, which suggests that the united states has little to fear from other democracies. after a brief discussion of definitions of democracy and liberalism, the paper summarizes the reasons why the spread of democracy— especially liberal democracy— benefits the citizens of new democracies, promotes international peace, and serves u."23 a democratic political process based on electoral competition depends on freedom of expression of political views and freedom to make electoral choices. Scholars, policymakers, and commentators embraced the idea that democratization could become America's next mission. as sen points out, "the plight of famine victims is easy to politicize" and "the effectiveness of democracy in the prevention of famine has tended to depend on the politicization of the plight of famine victims, through the process of public discussion, which generates political solidarity. sudan and ethiopia, which were nondemocracies, suffered major famines, whereas the democracies of botswana and zimbabwe did not.. america's goal: liberal democracygiven the variety of definitions of democracy and the distinction between democracy and liberalism, what type of government should the united states attempt to spread?. and global interests would be advanced if the world contained more democracies."87finally, critics of the institutional-structural explanation have not addressed the claim that democratic institutions endow democracies with better information-processing capabilities that enable democracies to limit the myths that cause war and to avoid wars when international circumstances render war unwise. in most cases, support for electoral democracy can contribute to the spread of liberalism and liberal democracy."9 samuel huntington "defines a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. given its founding principles and very identity, the united states has a large stake in advancing its core value of liberty. 2: see douglas brinkley, "democratic enlargement: the clinton doctrine," foreign policy, no. towards a theory of external democracy promotion: a proposal for theoretical classification. the united states would be more secure if russia, china, and at least some countries in the arab and islamic worlds became stable democracies. (the discovery of evidence to refute this proposition would have profound biological, philosophical, and theological implications, not to mention its effects on retirement planning and the future of the social security system. 63: see bruce russett and zeev maoz, "normative and structural causes of democratic peace," american political science review, vol.. america's goal: liberal democracygiven the variety of definitions of democracy and the distinction between democracy and liberalism, what type of government should the united states attempt to spread? they have argued that there is not a convincing theoretical explanation of the apparent absence of war between democracies, that democracies actually have fought one another, that the absence of wars between democracies is not statistically significant, and that factors other than shared democratic institutions or values have caused the democratic peace. this view holds that greater liberty will allow the human spirit to flourish, thereby unleashing greater intellectual, artistic, and productive energies that will ultimately benefit all of humankind. many indians have, however, suffered from hunger and malnutrition since 1947, but the country has avoided the catastrophic famines that previously plagued it. recent important discussions of liberty include robert nozick, anarchy, state, and utopia (new york: basic books, 1974); berlin, four essays on liberty; and stephen holmes, passions and constraint: on the theory of liberal democracy (chicago: university of chicago press, 1995). the united states should support democracy and liberalism; supporting only the latter risks not achieving either. a different sort of institutional argument suggests that democratic processes and freedom of speech make democracies better at avoiding myths and misperceptions that cause wars. to the extent that americans care about citizens of other countries and international peace, they will see benefits from the continued spread of democracy. and there are probably additional explanations for why at least some democratic dyads have remained at peace. bruce bueno de mesquita and david lalman argue that "some political institutions help foster beliefs . instead, proponents of the democratic peace have advanced several explanations and they continue to explicate and refine the logic of each. other quantitative studies challenge the statistical significance of mansfield and snyder's results, suggest that there is an even stronger connection between movements toward autocracy and the onset of war, find that it is actually unstable transitions and reversals of democratization that increase the probability of war, and argue that democratization diminishes the likelihood of militarized international disputes. in particular, autocracies are likely to exploit nationalism and manipulate public opinion to launch diversionary wars-the same causal mechanisms that mansfield and snyder claim are at work in democratizing states. compared to inhabitants of nondemocracies, citizens of democracies enjoy greater individual liberty, political stability, freedom from governmental violence, enhanced quality of life, and a much lower risk of suffering a famine. thus evidence that democracies are sensitive to power and interest does not refute the democratic-peace proposition. donations allow us to invest in new open access titles and pay our. second argument also is unpersuasive, because farber and gowa make an arbitrary decision to slice up the data into different periods and categories. the end of conscription in many countries and the tendency for wars to be fought by volunteer professional armies may further erode public opposition to the use of force. most of the world's leading economies thus tend to be market economies, including the united states, japan, the "tiger" economies of southeast asia, and the members of the organization for economic cooperation and development. if all participants in the political process remain committed to democratic principles, critics of the government need not stage violent revolutions and governments will not use violence to repress opponents. 649-664; and weede, "some simple calculations on democracy and war involvement," journal of peace research, vol. marcos in the philippines and pinochet in chile were removed from power largely because of the growing international belief in the electoral principle. 97: spiro, "the insignificance of the liberal peace"; and ray, democracy and international conflict, pp. the american culture of individualism, not more universal liberal and democratic values, is responsible for many u.: these criticisms of electoral democracy are important reminders that democracy is imperfect and so are democracies.

Why the United States Should Spread Democracy | Belfer Center for

56: zeev maoz and bruce russett, "alliance, contiguity, wealth, and political stability: is the lack of conflict among democracies a statistical artifact? in illiberal or semiliberal democracies, norms play a lesser role and crises are more likely, but democratic institutions and processes may still make wars between illiberal democracies rare.. promoting elections may be harmful or irrelevantthe arguments: one of the most prominent recent criticisms of attempts to promote democracy claims that democratic elections often have few positive effects, especially in countries that do not have liberal societies or other socioeconomic conditions such as a large middle class and a high level of economic development. as deputy secretary of state strobe talbott has argued: "the united states is uniquely and self-consciously a country founded on a set of ideas, and ideals, applicable to people everywhere. the paper then turns to a rebuttal of four prominent recent arguments against the benefits of spreading democracy: (1) the claim that the democratic peace is a myth; (2) the argument that the process of democratization increases the risk of war; (3) arguments that democratic elections are harmful in societies that are not fully liberal; and (4) claims that "asian values" can undergird polities based on "soft authoritarianism" that are superior to liberal democracies. the relative-gains argument sometimes assumes that states have high and constant concerns about relative gains.: proponents of the democratic-peace proposition do not deny that considerations of power and interest often motivate states. gurr and barbara harff, ethnic conflict and world politics (boulder, colorado: westview press, 1994); and larry diamond and marc f. in at least some of these cases, democratic decision-making processes may make democracies "smarter" and better able to recognize systemic incentives. 26: for some discussions of liberalism and its critics, see holmes, the anatomy of antiliberalism; and michael j., there are reasons to doubt the strength of the relationship between democratization and war. nevertheless, the variety of causal mechanisms and our incomplete understanding of many of them do not lead us to the conclusion that some human beings will not die. participants on both sides claimed that their opponents had been blinded by ideology and refused to view the evidence objectively. some writers have simply defined it by what it is not: "democracy is a system in which no one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with the power to rule and, therefore, no one can abrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power. from a general perspective, every american president “face[s] difficult choices when [he] comes to balancing american core interests with its underlying values” (4). mearsheimer, "back to the future: instability in europe after the cold war," in lynn-jones and miller, eds. a second recent study confirms the connection between economic freedom and economic growth. instead, proponents of the democratic peace have advanced several explanations and they continue to explicate and refine the logic of each. singapore, malaysia, china, indonesia, and other asian economies achieved annual growth rates of 10% or higher in the 1980s and most of 1990s. the second argument claims that the absence of war between democracies is only statistically significant after world war ii, and that the democratic peace since 1945 has been a product of the alignment of most democracies against the soviet union. 3-35; erich weede, "democracy and war involvement," journal of conflict resolution, vol. this budget or anything close to it were enacted into law, the result would be a severe setback for international relations and america's standing in the world; for clean air and water for americans: for progress in conquering cancer, influenza, and alzheimer's; for the fight against human-caused climate change; for u.. the spread of democracy is good for the united statesthe united states will have an interest in promoting democracy because further democratization enhances the lives of citizens of other countries and contributes to a more peaceful international system. it argues that the united states should promote democracy and refutes some of the most important arguments against u. brumberg), in islam and democracy in the middle east (diamond,Plattner, and brumberg, eds., democracy and peace: a more skeptical view," journal of peace research, vol.: the most sophisticated statistical analyses of the evidence for the democratic peace take these variables into account and still conclude that there is a strong relationship between democracy and peace. the economist amartya sen concludes that "one of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famine is that no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press. from theodore roosevelt’s “national mission” (40-42) to wilson’s commitment in europe and latin america (53-63), from f. the united states therefore should attempt to build support for liberal principles-many of which are enshrined in international human-rights treaties-as well as encouraging states to hold free and fair elections. the new democracies plagued by the most violence, including some former soviet republics and the republics of the former yugoslavia, are those that are the least democratic and may not qualify as democracies at all. indeed, if the democratic peace proposition is only partially valid and if it is at least dimly understood by decisionmakers, democracies will find other democracies less threatening than nondemocracies and therefore will tend to align with them against nondemocracies. totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in the twentieth century. second, in emerging democracies without strong democratic institutions new rulers compete for support by playing the nationalist card and search for foreign scapegoats for failures.. leadership in science and technology; for culture and the arts; and, yes, for american business, which depends on government services far more heavily than is generally recognized. democracies resolve their domestic conflicts without violence, and they expect that other democracies will resolve inter-democratic international disputes peacefully. in 1995, the population reference bureau reported that americans kill each other at a rate 17 times higher than in japan and ireland, 10 times the rates in germany and france, and five times the rate in canada. free and fair elections often remove leaders who are the biggest impediments to the spread of democracy."note 132: for examples of these views, see fareed zakaria, "culture is destiny: a conversation with lee kwan yew," foreign affairs, vol. bush with his renewed emphasis on the external democratic ‘enforcement’, faced the need to preserve us relations with non-democratic countries that are vital to us global and regional interests. (the discovery of evidence to refute this proposition would have profound biological, philosophical, and theological implications, not to mention its effects on retirement planning and the future of the social security system. ward and kristian gleditsch, "democratizing for peace," american political science review, vol. see, for example, andrew kydd, "why security seekers do not fight each other," security studies, vol.. divorce rates, out-of-wedlock births, and crime rates, are evidence of liberty run wild. trade agreements are long and complicated today because they are no longer primarily concerned with reducing tariffs (which are already quite low)."54 subsequent statistical studies have found that this absence of war between democracies is statistically significant and is not the result of random chance. the spread of liberal democracy does not, however, mean that the united states should give the promotion of liberalism priority over the growth of electoral democracy. ed, with jonathan hartlyn,Juan linz, and seymour martin lipset (boulder, co: lynne rienner publishers,Democratization in africa,Edited with marc f. and democratic consolidation in korea," with doh chull shin,In diamond and shin, eds.: proponents of the democratic-peace proposition do not deny that considerations of power and interest often motivate states.. american ideals flourish when others adopt themfifth, the spread of democracy internationally is likely to increase americans' psychological sense of well-being about their own democratic institutions. they also highlight the importance of the distinction between democracy and liberalism."34 the soviet union was unable to sustain its rapid growth; its economic failings ultimately caused the country to disintegrate in the throes of political and economic turmoil. most of the world's leading economies thus tend to be market economies, including the united states, japan, the "tiger" economies of southeast asia, and the members of the organization for economic cooperation and development., demokratia: a conversation on democracies, ancient and modern (princeton: princeton university pres, 1996). botswana's food production fell by 17% and zimbabwe's by 38% between 1979-81 and 1983-84, whereas sudan and ethiopia saw a decline in food production of 11-12% during the same period. this section presents logic and evidence that demonstrates that the spread of democracy consistently advances many important values, including individual freedom from political oppression, deadly violence, and hunger. skeptics will immediately ask: why should the united states attempt to improve the lives of non-americans? at the most general level, democratic leaders are constrained by the public, which is sometimes pacific and generally slow to mobilize for war. in korea," with byung-kook kim, in diamond and kim, eds. 57: for one of the earliest statements of this finding, see melvin small and j.” discussion paper, 98-07, belfer center for science and international affairs, harvard kennedy school, march 1998. which policies work and under what circumstances do they work?"39 these conditions also happen to be those that are necessary to maintain a stable system of free and fair elections and to uphold liberal principles of individual rights. the world's principal sponsors of international terrorism are harsh, authoritarian regimes, including syria, iran, iraq, north korea, libya, and sudan., the existence of a free press and the free flow of information in democracies prevents famine by serving as an early warning system on the effects of natural catastrophes such as floods and droughts that may cause food scarcities. 1151-1169; and stephen holmes, the anatomy of antiliberalism (cambridge, mass. a different sort of institutional argument suggests that democratic processes and freedom of speech make democracies better at avoiding myths and misperceptions that cause wars.

Larry Diamond | Curriculum Vitae

american policy should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good by insisting that countries embrace liberal principles before holding elections. as deputy secretary of state strobe talbott has argued: "the united states is uniquely and self-consciously a country founded on a set of ideas, and ideals, applicable to people everywhere. in the united states, continued public concern over human rights in other countries, as well as governmental and nongovernmental efforts to relieve hunger, poverty, and suffering overseas, suggest that americans accept some bonds of common humanity and feel some obligations to foreigners. in practice, it is approximated by singapore's political system, but elements of it have been embraced by malaysia, china, and indonesia. the first argument-that democracy causes moral decline and social disintegration-is not persuasive, because not all liberal democracies suffer such ills. 130: the relationship between liberalism, democracy, and ethnic conflict is complex."30 (2) democratic polities allow opposition to be expressed openly and have regular processes for the peaceful transfer of power. second section outlines the main arguments for why spreading democracy benefits the inhabitants of newly democratizing states, promotes peace in the international system, and advances u."77 in other words, the realist logic of anarchy, which posits that states exist in a hobbesian world of fear, suspicion and potential war, applies even to relations between democracies., neorealism and neoliberalism: the contemporary debate (new york: columbia university press, 1993). world’s leading open access website for students and scholars of international politics. these factors exist when leaders face periodic elections and when the press is free to report information that might embarrass the government. in practice, however, relative-gains concerns vary and are often almost nonexistent. the logic and evidence of a democratic peace are also summarized, as are the ways in which u. maoz and russett focused on the "politically-relevant" dyads, which account for most wars. canada and most european countries demonstrate that liberal democracy does not cause social collapse. in most cases, support for electoral democracy can contribute to the spread of liberalism and liberal democracy..teresa and john heinz professor of environmental policy, harvard kennedy school of governmentsenior advisor to the president, the woods hole research centerformerly president obama’s science advisor and director of the white house office of science and technology policy (january 2009 – january 2017). 9, 10, and 18, cited in diamond, promoting democracy in the 1990s, p. some writers have simply defined it by what it is not: "democracy is a system in which no one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with the power to rule and, therefore, no one can abrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power.. finley, democracy: ancient and modern (new brunswick, new jersey: rutgers university press, 1973); david stockton, classical athenian democracy (new york: oxford university press, 1990); and josiah ober and charles hedrick, eds. such a policy could be exploited by authoritarian rulers to justify their continued hold on power and to delay elections that they might lose.: proponents of the democratic peace counter that the involvement of the united states in chile in 1973 is usually the only example of covert intervention by a democracy in another democracy and that democracies as a group are actually less likely to engage in covert or overt interventions. the emergence of the so-called "cnn effect"-the tendency for americans to be aroused to action by television images of suffering people overseas-is further evidence that cosmopolitan ethical sentiments exist. and retreat in africa: the rule of law versus the big man,". it may be a clichã© to say that the world is becoming more interdependent, but it is undeniable that changes in communications technologies, trade flows, and the environment have opened borders and created a more interconnected world."20 as i argue below, one of the most important benefits of the spread of democracy-and especially of liberal democracy-is an expansion of human liberty.. the challenge from "asian values"the most important contemporary ideological challenge to democracy comes from east asia and has been called "soft authoritarianism" or the "asian values" argument. he classifies countries as "democratizing" if their combined freedom house scores for political rights and civil liberties (each measured on a 7-point scale with 1 denoting the most freedom and 7 the least) fall between 5 and 10. similar logic would imply that, for example, citizens in any country should act on the basis of the assumption that domestic law and order might collapse into anarchy and violence. in central and eastern europe, for example, bulgaria, the czech republic, estonia, hungary, latvia, lithuania, poland, romania, slovakia, and slovenia have avoided major internal and external conflicts. in most democracies, the legislative and executive branches check the war-making power of each other. its founding documents and institutions all emphasize that liberty is a core value. this type of electoral competition increases the risk of internal and international conflict. of course, some democracies do not adopt market economies and some autocracies do, but liberal democracies generally are more likely to pursue liberal economic policies. and when maoz adopts spiro's suggestion to look at dyads over their entire history, he finds that conflict actually fell when both countries in a dyad became democratic. any state that embraces liberal principles is likely to become a democracy, because political participation, competition, and accountability are perhaps the best guarantees that individual freedoms will be preserved. freedom house conducted a world survey of economic freedom for 1995-96, which evaluated 80 countries that account for 90% of the world's population and 99% of the world's wealth on the basis of criteria such as the right to own property, operate a business, or belong to a trade union.'"21third, improvements in the lives of individuals in other countries matter to americans because the united states cannot insulate itself from the world. 115: the most important challenge to mansfield and snyder is michael d. the evidence is mixed, but the need to build electoral coalitions and the liberal practices of free speech and freedom of association necessary to hold elections may promote ethnic accommodation, not hostility. democracies are more likely to adopt market economies, so democracies will tend to have more prosperous and open economies. a considerable body of opinion suggests that famines and hunger are not caused by a global or country-by-country shortage of food but by the failure to distribute food to those who most need it.. and global interests would be advanced if the world contained more democracies. literature in international relations has been looking with growing enthusiasm at democracy promotion as a research field. in practice, however, relative-gains concerns vary and are often almost nonexistent.. roosevelt’s “four freedoms” (76-78) to carter’s “age of limits” (121-124), from clinton’s “democratic enlargement” (164-170) to obama’s “stepping back” and “stepping up” (198-204), democracy promotion has been always vividly present in us foreign policy. in a world where the use of force remains possible, no government can afford to pursue a foreign policy based on altruism. proponents of the democratic peace need to refine the logic of each explanation and identify the conditions under which they apply, but the multiplicity of explanations does not mean that the democratic peace is invalid. they also highlight the importance of the distinction between democracy and liberalism., when using this ‘eclectic’ perspective, presenting a comprehensive and exhaustive analysis of the causes beyond the decision on how, when and why promoting democracy in one or another circumstance or case, is a difficult task. as marc plattner and carl gershman of the national endowment for democracy point out, none of the examples is a "practical vision" for the 21st century. it also will show how the spread of democracy promotes international peace and stability, and helps to ensure the security and prosperity of the united states. earlier historical examples of liberal nondemocracies include britain in the early 19th century, and possibly other european constitutional monarchies of that century. suberu, federalism and ethnic conflict in nigeria (washington,Dc: u. 48: amartya sen, "the economics of life and death," scientific american, may 1993, pp. some states may be more democratic than others; drawing the line between democracy and nondemocracy will usually be a matter of judgment.. forces deposed the junta led by general raoul cedras and restored the democratically elected government of jean-bertrand aristide, even though haiti's economic fortunes did not immediately improve. its founding documents and institutions all emphasize that liberty is a core value. elections do not only remove unpopular authoritarians, however; they also encourage the development of liberal habits and principles such as freedom of speech and of the press. a policy of spreading democracy would be justified if democracies have, for example, avoided war 99. public jingoism and enthusiasm for war accompanied the outbreak of world war one and helped cause the spanish-american war. this budget or anything close to it were enacted into law, the result would be a severe setback for international relations and america's standing in the world; for clean air and water for americans: for progress in conquering cancer, influenza, and alzheimer's; for the fight against human-caused climate change; for u. 73: see the essays by layne, spiro, farber and gowa, and oren in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds. mansfield and snyder are working on a book (forthcoming from the mit press in the bcsia studies in international security series) that will present their arguments more comprehensively and with additional data and case studies. although wars between democracies and nondemocracies would persist in the short run, in the long run an international system composed of democracies would be a peaceful world."note 99: see, for example, bruce russett, "the democratic peace: and yet it moves," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds. finally, state-level factors like norms and domestic structures may interact with international-systemic factors to prevent wars between democracies.

H-Diplo Article Review 657 on “Bill Clinton's 'Democratic

modern democracy, on the other hand, relies on elected representatives and tends to draw a distinction between the public and private spheres, thereby eroding the bonds of community and fostering individualism. tito's yugoslavia avoided violent disintegration, but hundreds of thousands of suspected separatists were killed on tito's orders, particularly in the late 1940s. freedom house's 1997 survey of "freedom in the world" found that 79 out of 118 democracies could be classified as "free" and 39 were "partly free" and, of those, 29 qualified as "high partly free. the first argument-that democracy causes moral decline and social disintegration-is not persuasive, because not all liberal democracies suffer such ills. 309-341; bremer, "democracy and militarized interstate conflict, 1816-1965," international interactions, vol. the international spread of democracy will offer many benefits to new democracies and to the united states."44 most of the countries that have experienced severe famines in recent decades have been among the world's least democratic: the soviet union (ukraine in the early 1930s), china, ethiopia, somalia, cambodia and sudan. mansfield and snyder are working on a book (forthcoming from the mit press in the bcsia studies in international security series) that will present their arguments more comprehensively and with additional data and case studies. podcast: shafeeq ghabra "transition in regime, state, and society in the arab world". plattner and carl gershman, "democracy gets a bum rap," wall street journal, interactive edition, january 26, 1998. their recent economic turmoil is probably only a temporary setback, and the fact that it disrupted financial markets around the world testifies to the growing economic importance of these countries., zakaria and kaplan overlook the extent to which the holding of elections is (a) an important way of removing authoritarian leaders, and (b) part of the process of encouraging the growth of liberal values., demokratia: a conversation on democracies, ancient and modern (princeton: princeton university pres, 1996). scholars, policymakers, and commentators embraced the idea that democratization could become america's next mission., ethnicity and democracy in nigeria: the failure of the first republic. 7note 15: john owen, "how liberalism produces democratic peace," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds.: many quantitative analyses conclude that challenges to the statistical significance of the democratic peace do not withstand close scrutiny. but as crises develop between liberal democracies, they tend to act on the basis of their shared norms and draw back from the brink of war. if americans care about improving the lives of the citizens of other countries, then the case for promoting democracy grows stronger to the extent that promoting democracy is an effective means to achieve this end. the united states should support democracy and liberalism; supporting only the latter risks not achieving either. first, it is emerging as the most prominent, articulate, and comprehensive critique of liberal democracy. it distinguishes between democratic procedures of government and the political philosophy of liberalism, but also explains how the two are closely linked. in illiberal or semiliberal democracies, norms play a lesser role and crises are more likely, but democratic institutions and processes may still make wars between illiberal democracies rare. 12: for discussions of the differences between ancient and modern conceptions of democracy, see m. modern democracy, on the other hand, relies on elected representatives and tends to draw a distinction between the public and private spheres, thereby eroding the bonds of community and fostering individualism.. workers would have to compete with foreign industries where labor and environmental standards are much lower than they are in the united states. nevertheless, it seems likely that proponents of "asian values" will offer a less strident challenge to liberal and democratic values in the future and that asian countries will pursue political liberalization as part of their economic reforms. and when maoz adopts spiro's suggestion to look at dyads over their entire history, he finds that conflict actually fell when both countries in a dyad became democratic. for example, zakaria's criteria would classify france as an illiberal democracy because it scores higher on political rights (1) than civil liberties (2), and gabon as a liberal democracy because its civil liberties score (4) is higher than its political rights (5). the british fabian socialist sidney webb, for example, articulated this view clearly: "the perfect and fitting development of each individual is not necessarily the utmost and highest cultivation of his own personality, but the filling, in the best possible way, of his humble function in the great social machine. instead, contemporary trade agreements are mostly about harmonizing labor, regulatory, environmental, and copyright standards across many different societies, precisely for the purpose of creating fairer competition between states. united states also should attempt to build support for liberal principles, both before and after other countries hold elections. some east asians point to the philippines and argue that democracy is responsible for its domestic instability and economic malaise, but that country's economic performance has improved dramatically in recent years. case of india before and after independence provides further evidence that democratic rule is a key factor in preventing famines. freedom house conducted a world survey of economic freedom for 1995-96, which evaluated 80 countries that account for 90% of the world's population and 99% of the world's wealth on the basis of criteria such as the right to own property, operate a business, or belong to a trade union. this type of electoral competition increases the risk of internal and international conflict. for example, in liberal democracies liberal norms and democratic processes probably work in tandem to synergistically produce the democratic peace. tito's yugoslavia avoided violent disintegration, but hundreds of thousands of suspected separatists were killed on tito's orders, particularly in the late 1940s.. interests include a reduction in threats to the united states, fewer refugees attempting to enter the united states, and better economic partners for american trade and investment. 121: mansfield and snyder, "democratization and the danger of war," p. 36: see gerald segal, china changes shape: regionalism and foreign policy, adelphi paper no., the cold war and after: prospects for peace, expanded edition (cambridge, mass. claims that the asian model is in a crisis and will be abandoned are probably overstated, just as asian leaders tended to overstate the virtues of their approach when their economies were flourishing., america should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments. holmes and melanie kirkpatrick, "freedom and growth," wall street journal, interactive edition, december 16, 1996. 103: see farber and gowa, "polities and peace"; mearsheimer, "back to the future," pp."87finally, critics of the institutional-structural explanation have not addressed the claim that democratic institutions endow democracies with better information-processing capabilities that enable democracies to limit the myths that cause war and to avoid wars when international circumstances render war unwise. their recent economic turmoil is probably only a temporary setback, and the fact that it disrupted financial markets around the world testifies to the growing economic importance of these countries. the first section of this paper defines democracy and the closely related concept of liberalism. these and other economic decisions require assurances that private property will be respected and that contracts will be enforced. 73: see the essays by layne, spiro, farber and gowa, and oren in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds. totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in the twentieth century. in other cases, including many infectious and chronic diseases, the precise biological and physiological processes that cause death are not fully understood. and iraq (baltimore: john hopkins university press,The lessons learned," current history, (january 2006) 34-39. for a brief overview and evaluation of the contending positions in the debate over whether there are moral obligations to foreigners, see joseph s. and the beginning of the fourth," in joao espada and marc f. these three reasons, at least, americans should care about how the spread of democracy can improve the lives of people in other countries. 265-276; susan peterson, "how democracies differ: public opinion, state structure, and the lessons of the fashoda crisis," security studies, vol. 24: adrian karatnycky, "freedom on the march," in freedom review, vol. 116: mansfield and snyder, "democratization and the danger of war," p. paper argues that the united states should make promoting democracy abroad one of its central foreign-policy goals. the second argument claims that the absence of war between democracies is only statistically significant after world war ii, and that the democratic peace since 1945 has been a product of the alignment of most democracies against the soviet union. the logic of the theory, however, can be recast in terms of checks and balances. some east asians point to the philippines and argue that democracy is responsible for its domestic instability and economic malaise, but that country's economic performance has improved dramatically in recent years."45 on the other hand, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are not accountable to the public; they are less likely to pay a political price for failing to prevent famines. this school of thought argues that countries should be ruled by a wise and authoritarian elite, that individual rights often need to be limited for the sake of the broader community, and that the state should play a leading role in economic development. 25-46; and joshua muravchik, exporting democracy: fulfilling america's destiny (washington, d. attempts to articulate a distinctive "asian way" and to criticize liberal democratic principles have provoked broader debates on the difference between asian and western cultures, whether there is a uniquely asian approach to politics and economics, and the international implications of east asia's rise.

Democracy promotion and american foreign policy a review essay-Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion on JSTOR

Policy Roundtable 1-6: Is Liberal Internationalism Still Alive

: how the kmt lost"and the dpp won"the 2000 presidential. for a reconsideration of the claim that democracies are as war-prone as other types of states, see james lee ray, democracy and international conflict: an evaluation of the democratic peace proposition (columbia: university of south carolina press, 1995), pp. classical athenian democracy was based on the ideals of full political participation of all citizens, a strong sense of community, the sovereignty of the people, and equality of all citizens under law. third, and most generally, some east asians claim that liberal democracy is not a suitable form of government for asian countries, because asia has a different set of cultural values that include a strong emphasis on communalism., americans have a particular interest in promoting the spread of liberty. these trends give the united states a greater stake in the fate of other societies, because widespread misery abroad may create political turmoil, economic instability, refugee flows, and environmental damage that will affect americans.- belfer center for science and international affairs, harvard kennedy school. larry diamond argues that a democracy must have "extensive civil liberties (freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations). although wars between democracies and nondemocracies would persist in the short run, in the long run an international system composed of democracies would be a peaceful world. 9, 10, and 18, cited in diamond, promoting democracy in the 1990s, p. any state that embraces liberal principles is likely to become a democracy, because political participation, competition, and accountability are perhaps the best guarantees that individual freedoms will be preserved. recent important discussions of liberty include robert nozick, anarchy, state, and utopia (new york: basic books, 1974); berlin, four essays on liberty; and stephen holmes, passions and constraint: on the theory of liberal democracy (chicago: university of chicago press, 1995). the evidence on whether democratization increases the risk of war is mixed, at best, and policies can be crafted to minimize any risks of conflict in these cases. the founding fathers declared that all were created equal-not just those in britain's 13 american colonies-and that to secure the 'unalienable rights' of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, people had the right to establish governments that derive 'their just powers from the consent of the governed. 109: see layne, "kant or cant," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds. because of this intense and ongoing controversy, establishing the case for the democratic peace now requires rebutting some of the most prominent criticisms. 649-664; and weede, "some simple calculations on democracy and war involvement," journal of peace research, vol. "civil society, social capital, and civic engagement in japan and. the iis democratization seminar, stanford university, january 11,For the long haul," remarks by larry diamond to the aid partners conference,"growth and equivocation. edward mansfield and jack snyder make this argument and support it with statistical evidence that shows a correlation between democratization and war.. the challenge from "asian values"the most important contemporary ideological challenge to democracy comes from east asia and has been called "soft authoritarianism" or the "asian values" argument. the internationa spread of democracy will offer many benefits to new democracies and to the united states. the economist amartya sen concludes that "one of the remarkable facts in the terrible history of famine is that no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press. thompson, "democracy and peace: putting the cart before the horse? free and fair elections often remove leaders who are the biggest impediments to the spread of democracy. 11: see, for example, james lee ray, democracy and international conflict (columbia: university of south carolina press, 1995), pp. in light of the absence of democratic and liberal traditions in many new democracies (particularly in the former soviet union and africa), it is remarkable that freedom continues to flourish to the extent that it does.- belfer center for science and international affairs, harvard kennedy school. for additional data, see amartya sen, "the economics of life and death," scientific american, may 1993, pp. finally, state-level factors like norms and domestic structures may interact with international-systemic factors to prevent wars between democracies. 13: larry diamond, promoting democracy in the 1990s: actors and instruments, issues and imperatives, a report to the carnegie commission on preventing deadly conflict, carnegie corporation of new york, december 1995, p. 169 (note 2), and bruce russett and james lee ray, "why the democratic-peace proposition lives," review of international studies, vol."beyond incrementalism:A new strategy for dealing with iran" with michael mcfaul and abbas. doyle, "kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs," philosophy and public affairs, vol. nevertheless, the variety of causal mechanisms and our incomplete understanding of many of them do not lead us to the conclusion that some human beings will not die. this section presents logic and evidence that demonstrates that the spread of democracy consistently advances many important values, including individual freedom from political oppression, deadly violence, and hunger. the international spread of democracy will offer many benefits to new democracies and to the united states. 2: see douglas brinkley, "democratic enlargement: the clinton doctrine," foreign policy, no. sources of stress and conflict in industrial democracies of post-cold war europe," security studies, vol. the spread of liberal democracy does not, however, mean that the united states should give the promotion of liberalism priority over the growth of electoral democracy. the heritage foundation has constructed an index of economic freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. by the late 1990s, proponents and critics of the democratic peace were engaged in a vigorous and sometimes heated debate. second, in emerging democracies without strong democratic institutions new rulers compete for support by playing the nationalist card and search for foreign scapegoats for failures. and the "soft authoritarian" challenge to liberal democracy was not persuasive, even before the asian economic turmoil of 1997 and 1998 undermined claims for the superiority of "asian values., edited with ehud sprinzak (boulder, co: lynne rienner publishers,Political culture and., zakaria and kaplan overlook the extent to which the holding of elections is (a) an important way of removing authoritarian leaders, and (b) part of the process of encouraging the growth of liberal values. if all participants in the political process remain committed to democratic principles, critics of the government need not stage violent revolutions and governments will not use violence to repress opponents., democracy's victory and crisis: nobel symposium 1994 (cambridge:Cambridge university press, 1997). freedom house's 1997 ratings show that civil liberties have improved in 10 of the countries zakaria identifies as "democratizing" and fallen in only 4. the new democracies plagued by the most violence, including some former soviet republics and the republics of the former yugoslavia, are those that are the least democratic and may not qualify as democracies at all. some states may be more democratic than others; drawing the line between democracy and nondemocracy will usually be a matter of judgment. 4: see robert kagan, "democracies and double standards," commentary, august 1997, pp. 1-10; joanne gowa, "democratic states and international disputes," international organization, vol. in a prominent article, robert kaplan has argued that holding democratic elections in many countries may actually hinder efforts to maintain ethnic peace, social stability, and economic development. 1-10; joanne gowa, "democratic states and international disputes," international organization, vol.- belfer center for science and international affairs, harvard kennedy school quarterly journal: international security. 185; christopher layne, "kant or cant: the myth of the democratic peace," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds.. american ideals flourish when others adopt themfifth, the spread of democracy internationally is likely to increase americans' psychological sense of well-being about their own democratic institutions."the democratic rollback:The resurgence of the predatory state," foreign affairs (march/april. see rummel, "libertarianism and international violence," journal of conflict resolution, vol. this absence-or near absence, depending on the definitions of "war" and "democracy" used-has been called "one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations. 103: see farber and gowa, "polities and peace"; mearsheimer, "back to the future," pp. without end:Nigerian politics and civil society under babangida, edited with."what went wrong in iraq,And prospects for democracy and stability" presented to the ucla international. the divide between the presidential rhetoric on democracy promotion and its practical relevance in us foreign policy has covered the entirety of american history. of failure, seeds of hope," in diamond, linz, and lipset,Eds. a policy of spreading democracy would be justified if democracies have, for example, avoided war 99. the 1990s: actors, instruments, and issues," in axel hadenius,Ed.

Frontier Thesis - Wikipedia

this factor is particularly likely to be important in former communist countries, but it also appears to have played a role in the decisions india and the philippines have taken in recent years to pursue difficult economic reforms. attempts to articulate a distinctive "asian way" and to criticize liberal democratic principles have provoked broader debates on the difference between asian and western cultures, whether there is a uniquely asian approach to politics and economics, and the international implications of east asia's rise. 13: larry diamond, promoting democracy in the 1990s: actors and instruments, issues and imperatives, a report to the carnegie commission on preventing deadly conflict, carnegie corporation of new york, december 1995, p. 105: see siverson and emmons, "birds of a feather," and kurt taylor gaubatz, "democratic states and commitment in international relations," international organization, vol. authors have tried to present some relevant case studies, using us relations with latin american regimes, china or the soviet union as ‘workshops’ to explain the shift and criticality in us democracy promotion worldwide.- belfer center for science and international affairs, harvard kennedy school. for the argument that population growth is higher in authoritarian regimes, regardless of their level of wealth, see adam przeworski and fernando limongi, "democracy and development," paper presented to the nobel symposium on democracy's victory and crisis, uppsala university, sweden, august 27-30, 1994, pp. these arguments imply that electoral democracy may be undesirable in many countries and that the united states should not encourage its spread. policies to promote democracy should attempt to increase the number of regimes that respect the individual liberties that lie at the heart of liberalism and elect their leaders. these three reasons, at least, americans should care about how the spread of democracy can improve the lives of people in other countries. to be sure, these bonds and obligations are limited by the competitive nature of the international system. these arguments imply that electoral democracy may be undesirable in many countries and that the united states should not encourage its spread. 19-26 for the argument that the clinton administration is showing less enthusiasm for promoting democracy, and for a summary and critique of recent arguments against promoting democracy. see strobe talbott, "democracy and the national interest," foreign affairs, vol. 25-46; and joshua muravchik, exporting democracy: fulfilling america's destiny (washington, d. the clinton administration's commitment to spreading democracy seems to have faltered, and critics from across the political spectrum have argued that the united states should scale back or abandon efforts to foster global democratization. such a policy could be exploited by authoritarian rulers to justify their continued hold on power and to delay elections that they might lose. india, botswana, and zimbabwe have avoided famines, even when they have suffered large crop shortfalls. second section outlines the main arguments for why spreading democracy benefits the inhabitants of newly democratizing states, promotes peace in the international system, and advances u., democracy program, center on democracy, development, and the rule of law, stanford university. many indians have, however, suffered from hunger and malnutrition since 1947, but the country has avoided the catastrophic famines that previously plagued it. these countries are indisputably democratic, but they are far less violent than the united states, and they do not have america's social problems.. the benefits of the spread of democracymost americans assume that democracy is a good thing and that the spread of democracy will be beneficial. third argument's assertion that democratic government is incompatible with east asian values is belied by the relatively successful growth of democracy in japan, south korea, and, more recently, taiwan and the philippines. see also jack snyder and karen ballentine, "nationalism and the marketplace of ideas," international security, vol. as i argue below, there is still a compelling deductive and empirical case that democracies are extremely unlikely to fight one another. 6: fareed zakaria, "the rise of illiberal democracy," foreign affairs, vol. 59: this type of argument appears in doyle, "kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds. thus the terms "liberal" and "democracy" often go hand in hand. these arguments do not rest on an assessment of the empirical evidence, but instead rely on analyses and critiques of the internal consistency and persuasiveness of the theoretical explanations of the democratic peace. it often will be difficult for the united states and other actors to help countries to become democracies, but international efforts frequently can make a difference. american policy should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good by insisting that countries embrace liberal principles before holding elections. first, in democracies governments are accountable to their populations and their leaders have electoral incentives to prevent mass starvation. even imperfect and illiberal democracies tend to offer more liberty than autocracies, and liberal democracies are very likely to promote liberty. bruce russett argues: "if another nation's leaders regard a state as democratic, they will anticipate a difficult and lengthy process before the democracy is likely to use significant military force against them. in 65% of the states classified as illiberal democracies by zakaria, the difference between civil liberties and political rights is only one point on the 7-point freedom house scale. rummel also finds that citizens of liberal democracies are far less likely to die at the hands of their governments. he classifies countries as "democratizing" if their combined freedom house scores for political rights and civil liberties (each measured on a 7-point scale with 1 denoting the most freedom and 7 the least) fall between 5 and 10. 131: historically, of course, democracy has faced ideological challenges from marxism, fascism, and monarchism. 89: see forsythe, "democracy, war, and covert action"; and patrick james and glenn e. philippe schmitter and terry karl offer the following definition: "modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives. see also jack snyder and karen ballentine, "nationalism and the marketplace of ideas," international security, vol. two factors that prevent famines in democracies-electoral incentives and the free flow of information-are likely to be present even in democracies that do not have a liberal political culture. arguments suggest that zakaria, kaplan, and other critics of electoral democracy have taken the valid point that "elections are not enough" too far. more comprehensive tests would also deduce and test hypotheses about how many political and diplomatic aspects of crises between democratic states differ from other crises. plattner and carl gershman, "democracy gets a bum rap," wall street journal, interactive edition, january 26, 1998..teresa and john heinz professor of environmental policy, harvard kennedy school of governmentsenior advisor to the president, the woods hole research centerformerly president obama’s science advisor and director of the white house office of science and technology policy (january 2009 – january 2017). the author (alessandro badella):Tags: democracy, democracy promotion, us foreign policy. thus the terms "liberal" and "democracy" often go hand in hand.: many quantitative analyses conclude that challenges to the statistical significance of the democratic peace do not withstand close scrutiny. although this perspective has yet to become a coherent and unified political ideology, recent writings and statements from east asian leaders, government officials, and intellectuals contain several recurring arguments for the superiority of east asian political systems over western democracy. united states also should attempt to build support for liberal principles, both before and after other countries hold elections. some studies find that disputes between democracies and nondemocracies are less likely to escalate to war that disputes between nondemocracies, see zeev maoz and nasrin abdolai, "regime types and international conflict, 1817-1976," journal of conflict resolution, vol. india, botswana, and zimbabwe have avoided famines, even when they have suffered large crop shortfalls. campbell, "domestic structure, decisional constraints and war: so why kant democracies fight? in a prominent article, robert kaplan has argued that holding democratic elections in many countries may actually hinder efforts to maintain ethnic peace, social stability, and economic development. for a brief overview and evaluation of the contending positions in the debate over whether there are moral obligations to foreigners, see joseph s. skeptics will immediately ask: why should the united states attempt to improve the lives of non-americans? the food supply was high, but floods, unemployment, and panic made it harder for those in need to obtain food. since india became independent and democratic, the country has suffered severe crop failures and food shortages in 1968, 1973, 1979, and 1987, but it has never suffered a famine. 16: although the term "liberal" has become an epithet hurled at those on the left of the american political spectrum, virtually all american politicians and most of those in europe embrace the basic principles of liberalism. the more freely a political elite can control the power of the state apparatus, the more thoroughly it can repress and murder its subjects. see amartya sen, "war and famines: on divisions and incentives," discussion paper no. this section enumerates how the spread of democracy will improve the lives of the citizens of new democracies, contribute to international peace, and directly advance the national interests of the united states. 9: joseph schumpeter, capitalism, socialism, and democracy (london: allen and unwin, 1943), p. 130: the relationship between liberalism, democracy, and ethnic conflict is complex. 19: many political and moral philosophers have addressed this issue and it would be impossible to do full justice to their arguments in this essay. democracies have virtually never massacred their own citizens on a large scale, although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime.

Democracy Promotion | Foreign Affairs

sources of stress and conflict in industrial democracies of post-cold war europe," security studies, vol. 179, and christopher layne, "lord palmerston and the triumph of realism: anglo-french relations, 1830-48," in elman, ed. critics of the democratic peace have presented vigorous arguments that have forced the proposition's proponents to refine and qualify the case for the democratic peace. 119: mansfield and snyder, "democratization and the danger of war," pp. compared to inhabitants of nondemocracies, citizens of democracies enjoy greater individual liberty, political stability, freedom from governmental violence, enhanced quality of life, and a much lower risk of suffering a famine. in practice, it is approximated by singapore's political system, but elements of it have been embraced by malaysia, china, and indonesia. zakaria praises east asian countries on the grounds that they "have accorded their citizens a widening sphere of economic, civil, religious and limited political rights," and suggests that they, much like western countries around 1900, are on the road to liberty. he offers similar figures for the 20th century and for militarized disputes. 56: zeev maoz and bruce russett, "alliance, contiguity, wealth, and political stability: is the lack of conflict among democracies a statistical artifact? part of the impetus behind american attempts to spread democracy has always come from the belief that american democracy will be healthier when other countries adopt similar political systems. philippe schmitter and terry karl offer the following definition: "modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives."note 96: see russett, grasping the democratic peace; and james lee ray, democracy and international conflict. in addition to above cases, others that are mentioned frequently include: lebanon-israel, 1948; germany in the 1930s; and israel's 1982 invasion of lebanon. in addition to conducting multiparty elections and maintaining civil liberties, japan, south korea, and taiwan all have impressive economic records. addition, critics of the democratic-peace proposition have not tested it fairly; they have not deduced the full range of predictions that the normative and institutional model makes about how democracies will avoid war. 1151-1169; and stephen holmes, the anatomy of antiliberalism (cambridge, mass. schweller, "domestic structure and preventive war: are democracies more pacific? although this perspective has yet to become a coherent and unified political ideology, recent writings and statements from east asian leaders, government officials, and intellectuals contain several recurring arguments for the superiority of east asian political systems over western democracy. this factor is particularly likely to be important in former communist countries, but it also appears to have played a role in the decisions india and the philippines have taken in recent years to pursue difficult economic reforms. doyle, "kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs," philosophy and public affairs, vol. among the many observers and political scientists who make this point is samuel huntington, who argues that america's "identity as a nation is inseparable from its commitment to liberal and democratic values. the evidence on whether democratization increases the risk of war is mixed, at best, and policies can be crafted to minimize any risks of conflict in these cases. forsythe, "democracy, war, and covert action," journal of peace research, vol. in particular, what is relevant here is the fact that, as the authors show, national interest and specific components of us foreign policy have always had the power to influence (in one direction or another) the role and the application of the ‘democratic discourse’ in american foreign policy. democracies may distinguish between states on the basis of their political institutions, and pursue different policies toward those that are constrained by democratic institutions. even imperfect and illiberal democracies tend to offer more liberty than autocracies, and liberal democracies are very likely to promote liberty. rummel presents his definition explicitly: "by democracy is meant liberal democracy, where those who hold power are elected in competitive elections with a secret ballot and wide franchise (loosely understood as including at least two-thirds of adult males); where there is freedom of speech, religion, and organization; and a constitutional framework of law to which the government is subordinate and that guarantees equal rights."10 the plethora of definitions of democracy has stimulated many scholars to analyze and compare how the term is defined. the emergence of the so-called "cnn effect"-the tendency for americans to be aroused to action by television images of suffering people overseas-is further evidence that cosmopolitan ethical sentiments exist. because the virtues of democracy are taken for granted, they are rarely fully enumerated and considered. because of this intense and ongoing controversy, establishing the case for the democratic peace now requires rebutting some of the most prominent criticisms. see, for example, andrew kydd, "why security seekers do not fight each other," security studies, vol."18 in the 19th century britain embraced liberal principles before it extended the franchise and became a democracy. edward mansfield and jack snyder make this argument and support it with statistical evidence that shows a correlation between democratization and war. he offers similar figures for the 20th century and for militarized disputes. for example, zakaria's criteria would classify france as an illiberal democracy because it scores higher on political rights (1) than civil liberties (2), and gabon as a liberal democracy because its civil liberties score (4) is higher than its political rights (5). liberal dyads at war between 1816 and 1986, but they find only one: the spanish-american war."how people view democracy:Halting progress in korea and taiwan," with yun-han chu and doh chull. and democracy in the middle east, edited with marc f. and the "soft authoritarian" challenge to liberal democracy was not persuasive, even before the asian economic turmoil of 1997 and 1998 undermined claims for the superiority of "asian values. 43: amartya sen, "freedoms and needs," the new republic, january 10 and 17, 1994, p. elections alone do not guarantee that constitutional liberalism and the rule of law will be adopted, but they do focus the attention of the voting public on the process of freely electing their governments. kirk-greene and oyeleye oyediran (boulder: lynne rienner publishers,1997; and ibadan, nigeria, vantage publishers, 1997). larry diamond argues that a democracy must have "extensive civil liberties (freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations). project" of the center for a new american security, meeting 1,In post-conflict and failed states: lessons and challenges". to be sure, these bonds and obligations are limited by the competitive nature of the international system. as i argue below, there is still a compelling deductive and empirical case that democracies are extremely unlikely to fight one another. a free press that criticizes government policies also can publicize the true level of food stocks and reveal problems of distribution that might cause famines even when food is plentiful. 9: joseph schumpeter, capitalism, socialism, and democracy (london: allen and unwin, 1943), p., americans have a particular interest in promoting the spread of liberty.. security and economic interests would be advanced in a world of democracies.. democracies produce fewer refugeesthird, the spread of democracy will serve american interests by reducing the number of refugees who flee to the united states.. absence of consensus on what explains the democratic peacethe argument: the first, and most general criticism of the deductive logic of the democratic peace proposition holds that the lack of agreement on what causes democracies to avoid war with one another calls the proposition into question. 112: see owen, "how liberalism causes democratic peace"; and owen, liberal peace, liberal war: american politics and international security (ithaca, n. shouldn't this country focus on its own problems and interests? first, it is emerging as the most prominent, articulate, and comprehensive critique of liberal democracy. this is what some senior scholars have called “conflicting objectives” in democracy promotion (wolff et al. the american and british bombing campaigns against germany and japan, u. zakaria praises east asian countries on the grounds that they "have accorded their citizens a widening sphere of economic, civil, religious and limited political rights," and suggests that they, much like western countries around 1900, are on the road to liberty. the american culture of individualism, not more universal liberal and democratic values, is responsible for many u."44 most of the countries that have experienced severe famines in recent decades have been among the world's least democratic: the soviet union (ukraine in the early 1930s), china, ethiopia, somalia, cambodia and sudan. democracies may distinguish between states on the basis of their political institutions, and pursue different policies toward those that are constrained by democratic institutions. 108: see russett, grasping the democratic peace, and maoz, "the controversy over the democratic peace" for summaries of these studies. ten years of the hksar," center for strategic and international. the end of conscription in many countries and the tendency for wars to be fought by volunteer professional armies may further erode public opposition to the use of force. critics have offered four major challenges to the logic of the democratic peace: (a) there is no consensus on the causal mechanisms that keep democracies at peace: (b) the possibility that democracies may turn into nondemocracies means that even democracies operate according to realist principles; (c) the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace is flawed, not least because its logic also would predict that democracies are less likely to be involved in any wars, not just wars with other democracies; and (d) the normative explanation of the democratic peace is unpersuasive. the human race is not about to embrace a cosmopolitan moral vision in which borders and national identities become irrelevant. ready-to-use edited handbook provides a good and complete introduction to the history and evolution of US democracy promotion abroad.

The Backyard Effects in Democracy Promotion: Evidence from a

see also jean drã¨ze and amartya sen, hunger and public action (oxford: clarendon press, 1989). it also will show how the spread of democracy promotes international peace and stability, and helps to ensure the security and prosperity of the united states.. forces deposed the junta led by general raoul cedras and restored the democratically elected government of jean-bertrand aristide, even though haiti's economic fortunes did not immediately improve. in addition to conducting multiparty elections and maintaining civil liberties, japan, south korea, and taiwan all have impressive economic records. while in the past, as the editors lament, “democracy was never, ever, [considered] a major american foreign policy aim” (1), by the end of the cold war, due to the unipolar world system and growing western investment in ‘democratic aids’ in non-democratic countries, democracy promotion has become an important component of us (and western) foreign policy. the evidence is mixed, but the need to build electoral coalitions and the liberal practices of free speech and freedom of association necessary to hold elections may promote ethnic accommodation, not hostility. trade agreements are long and complicated today because they are no longer primarily concerned with reducing tariffs (which are already quite low). in at least some of these cases, democratic decision-making processes may make democracies "smarter" and better able to recognize systemic incentives.. democracies produce fewer refugeesthird, the spread of democracy will serve american interests by reducing the number of refugees who flee to the united states. in the united states, continued public concern over human rights in other countries, as well as governmental and nongovernmental efforts to relieve hunger, poverty, and suffering overseas, suggest that americans accept some bonds of common humanity and feel some obligations to foreigners. have presented several important challenges to the deductive logic and empirical bases of the democratic peace proposition. lake, "powerful pacifists: democratic states and war," american political science review, vol. singapore, malaysia, china, indonesia, and other asian economies achieved annual growth rates of 10% or higher in the 1980s and most of 1990s. they have argued that there is not a convincing theoretical explanation of the apparent absence of war between democracies, that democracies actually have fought one another, that the absence of wars between democracies is not statistically significant, and that factors other than shared democratic institutions or values have caused the democratic peace. firstly, this work is a good and complete introduction to the history and evolution of us democracy promotion worldwide, while showing that “the united states will forever be compelled to ‘promote’ its values, sometimes enthusiastically, sometimes not” (11). policies to promote democracy should attempt to increase the number of regimes that respect the individual liberties that lie at the heart of liberalism and elect their leaders. 115: the most important challenge to mansfield and snyder is michael d. third reason may operate in some circumstances: democratic governments are more likely to have the political legitimacy necessary to embark on difficult and painful economic reforms. each chapter tries to reflect on the divide between the presidential theoretical and ‘paradigmatic’ commitment to democracy promotion, according to the president’s embracement of one or another foreign policy doctrine, and their score (in practical terms) in democracy promotion worldwide. there is no reason to assume that democracies will become autocracies overnight and then immediately launch attacks on democracies. part of the impetus behind american attempts to spread democracy has always come from the belief that american democracy will be healthier when other countries adopt similar political systems. 3-35; erich weede, "democracy and war involvement," journal of conflict resolution, vol. the united states therefore should attempt to build support for liberal principles-many of which are enshrined in international human-rights treaties-as well as encouraging states to hold free and fair elections. the global spread of democracy is likely to bring greater individual liberty to more and more people. the evidence on whether democratization increases the risk of war is mixed, at best, and policies can be crafted to minimize any risks of conflict in these cases. the relative-gains argument sometimes assumes that states have high and constant concerns about relative gains. thompson, "democracy and peace: putting the cart before the horse? since the founding of ned and the challenges ahead," library. schweller, "domestic structure and preventive war: are democracies more pacific? the relative-gains argument holds that in international politics, cooperation is rare because it often gives greater gains to one state, and these relative disparities in gains can be turned into advantages in power than can be used to threaten the state that gains less. 287 (london: international institute for strategic studies, march 1994); and jack a. first, in democracies governments are accountable to their populations and their leaders have electoral incentives to prevent mass starvation. marcos in the philippines and pinochet in chile were removed from power largely because of the growing international belief in the electoral principle. this view holds that greater liberty will allow the human spirit to flourish, thereby unleashing greater intellectual, artistic, and productive energies that will ultimately benefit all of humankind. 21-22; and karatnycky, "still the bedrock of a better world. 120: mansfield and snyder, "democratization and the danger of war," p. more comprehensive tests would also deduce and test hypotheses about how many political and diplomatic aspects of crises between democratic states differ from other crises. holmes and melanie kirkpatrick, "freedom and growth," wall street journal, interactive edition, december 16, 1996. game, hard choices: the obama administration and democracy in egypt."77 in other words, the realist logic of anarchy, which posits that states exist in a hobbesian world of fear, suspicion and potential war, applies even to relations between democracies. 89: see forsythe, "democracy, war, and covert action"; and patrick james and glenn e. these trends give the united states a greater stake in the fate of other societies, because widespread misery abroad may create political turmoil, economic instability, refugee flows, and environmental damage that will affect americans. dixon, "democracy and the peaceful settlement of international conflict," american political science review, vol.: proponents of the democratic peace counter that the involvement of the united states in chile in 1973 is usually the only example of covert intervention by a democracy in another democracy and that democracies as a group are actually less likely to engage in covert or overt interventions., debating the democratic peace; raymond cohen, "pacific unions: a reappraisal of the theory that democracies do not fight one another," review of international studies, vol. it distinguishes between democratic procedures of government and the political philosophy of liberalism, but also explains how the two are closely linked. in the anarchic and competitive realm of international politics, democracies cannot avoid making such calculations. finland engaged in virtually no direct hostilities with the western allies during world war two; it fought almost entirely against communist russia. a free press that criticizes government policies also can publicize the true level of food stocks and reveal problems of distribution that might cause famines even when food is plentiful. these critics assume that alliance formation proceeds in strict accordance with realist logic and that regime type plays no role."note 96: see russett, grasping the democratic peace; and james lee ray, democracy and international conflict. mansfield and snyder object to enterline's focus on militarized international disputes (mids) instead of wars, but a strong case can be made for this choice., democracies are able to recognize and respond to states that are making a transition from democracy to authoritarianism. these countries are indisputably democratic, but they are far less violent than the united states, and they do not have america's social problems. mansfield and snyder object to enterline's focus on militarized international disputes (mids) instead of wars, but a strong case can be made for this choice. because the case for democratization is rarely made comprehensively, the paper explicates the arguments for why democracy promotes liberty, prevents famines, and fosters economic development. the clinton administration's commitment to spreading democracy seems to have faltered, and critics from across the political spectrum have argued that the united states should scale back or abandon efforts to foster global democratization. the short response to most critiques of liberty is that there appears to be a universal demand for liberty among human beings. these and other economic decisions require assurances that private property will be respected and that contracts will be enforced. liberal dyads at war between 1816 and 1986, but they find only one: the spanish-american war. rummel presents his definition explicitly: "by democracy is meant liberal democracy, where those who hold power are elected in competitive elections with a secret ballot and wide franchise (loosely understood as including at least two-thirds of adult males); where there is freedom of speech, religion, and organization; and a constitutional framework of law to which the government is subordinate and that guarantees equal rights. lake, "powerful pacifists: democratic states and war," american political science review, vol. spiro, "the insignificance of the liberal peace," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds. america’s mission: the united states and the worldwide struggle for democracy, princeton: princeton university press.- belfer center for science and international affairs, harvard kennedy school. as one scholar puts it, "liberalism's ends are life and property, and its means are liberty and toleration., there are reasons to doubt the strength of the relationship between democratization and war. 6: fareed zakaria, "the rise of illiberal democracy," foreign affairs, vol.

Why the United States Should Spread Democracy | Belfer Center for

. the spread of democracy is good for the united statesthe united states will have an interest in promoting democracy because further democratization enhances the lives of citizens of other countries and contributes to a more peaceful international system. 59: this type of argument appears in doyle, "kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds. second argument also is unpersuasive, because farber and gowa make an arbitrary decision to slice up the data into different periods and categories.,Reexamining democracy: essays in honor of seymour martin lipset,Pp. first, democracies-especially liberal democracies-are more likely to have market economies, and market economies tend to produce economic growth over the long run.. finley, democracy: ancient and modern (new brunswick, new jersey: rutgers university press, 1973); david stockton, classical athenian democracy (new york: oxford university press, 1990); and josiah ober and charles hedrick, eds. two factors that prevent famines in democracies-electoral incentives and the free flow of information-are likely to be present even in democracies that do not have a liberal political culture. forsythe, "democracy, war, and covert action," journal of peace research, vol. promoting democracy makes more sense than this course, because the risks of democratization are not so high and uncontrollable that we should give up on attempts to spread democracy. third section summarizes and rebuts some of the most prominent recent arguments against promoting democracy. 309-341; bremer, "democracy and militarized interstate conflict, 1816-1965," international interactions, vol. for the national policy forum on terrorism, security, and america's."like the president he now serves, anton doesn't understand how the global trading order actually works. rummel also finds that citizens of liberal democracies are far less likely to die at the hands of their governments. in south africa, haiti, and chile, for example, elections removed antidemocratic rulers and advanced the process of democratization. 90: on the weaknesses of the normative explanation more generally, see ray, democracy and international conflict, pp."9 samuel huntington "defines a twentieth-century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. the states that have killed millions of their citizens all have been authoritarian or totalitarian: the soviet union, the people's republic of china, nazi germany, nationalist china, imperial japan, and cambodia under the khmer rouge. of course, some democracies do not adopt market economies and some autocracies do, but liberal democracies generally are more likely to pursue liberal economic policies. germany in 1914 was not governed by liberal principles and its foreign policy was directed by the kaiser, not the elected reichstag."71 thus spreading democracy will produce more and better alliance partners for the united states. and the "soft authoritarian" challenge to liberal democracy was not persuasive, even before the asian economic turmoil of 1997 and 1998 undermined claims for the superiority of "asian values."34 the soviet union was unable to sustain its rapid growth; its economic failings ultimately caused the country to disintegrate in the throes of political and economic turmoil. liberalism is most closely associated with the political thought of john locke and john stuart mill, although thomas hobbes and adam smith also contributed to its development.. liberalism and democracydemocracy can be defined as a set of political procedures involving participation and competition, but liberalism is a political philosophy that is based on the principle of individual freedom. the principle that leaders should be selected in free and fair elections can become an international norm that can be used to persuade authoritarian leaders to step aside, sometimes gracefully., global transformation and the third world (boulder, co:Lynne rienner publishers, 1992), pp. it may be a clichã© to say that the world is becoming more interdependent, but it is undeniable that changes in communications technologies, trade flows, and the environment have opened borders and created a more interconnected world. the states that have killed millions of their citizens all have been authoritarian or totalitarian: the soviet union, the people's republic of china, nazi germany, nationalist china, imperial japan, and cambodia under the khmer rouge. sandel, liberalism and the limits of justice (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1982). mearsheimer, "back to the future: instability in europe after the cold war," in lynn-jones and miller, eds. 120: mansfield and snyder, "democratization and the danger of war," p. indeed, if the democratic peace proposition is only partially valid and if it is at least dimly understood by decisionmakers, democracies will find other democracies less threatening than nondemocracies and therefore will tend to align with them against nondemocracies. 287 (london: international institute for strategic studies, march 1994); and jack a. not all good things go together: conflicting objectives in democracy promotion.. colonization of the philippines after 1898, and french killings of algerians during the algerian war are some prominent examples. mansfield and jack snyder, "democratization and the danger of war," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds. rummel calls genocide and mass murder "democide," and distinguishes such killings from battle deaths. this disaster later led mao zedong to concede that "without democracy, you have no understanding of what is happening down below. campbell, "domestic structure, decisional constraints and war: so why kant democracies fight? the internationa spread of democracy will offer many benefits to new democracies and to the united states. argument: skeptics suggest that, if the democratic peace proposition is valid, we should find that pairs of democracies behave in crises in way that reveals that shared democracy, not considerations of power and interest, caused them to avoid war. there is no reason to assume that democracies will become autocracies overnight and then immediately launch attacks on democracies. but most observers-including some east asians-would argue that these countries have curtailed political liberties (and sometimes bragged about it in the debate over "asian values") and are hardly a model of liberalization that the united states should encourage. the evidence on whether democratization increases the risk of war is mixed, at best, and policies can be crafted to minimize any risks of conflict in these cases. proponents of the democratic peace need to refine the logic of each explanation and identify the conditions under which they apply, but the multiplicity of explanations does not mean that the democratic peace is invalid. the rights-based case for liberty, on the other hand, does not focus on the consequences of increased liberty, but instead argues that all men and women, by virtue of their common humanity, have a right to freedom. 105: see siverson and emmons, "birds of a feather," and kurt taylor gaubatz, "democratic states and commitment in international relations," international organization, vol. 357-360; and amartya sen, food, economics and entitlements (helsinki: world institute for development economic research, 1986).. democracy leads to liberty and liberty is goodthe first way in which the spread of democracy enhances the lives of those who live in democracies is by promoting individual liberty, including freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, and freedom to own private property. for additional data, see amartya sen, "the economics of life and death," scientific american, may 1993, pp. for discussions of liberty and liberalism, see "liberalism defined: the perils of complacency," the economist, december 21, 1996; isaiah berlin, "two concepts of liberty," in berlin, four essays on liberalism (london: oxford university press, 1969); michael doyle, "liberalism and world politics," american political science review, vol. see amartya sen, "war and famines: on divisions and incentives," discussion paper no. democracy does not guarantee economic success and may even hinder it.. colonization of the philippines after 1898, and french killings of algerians during the algerian war are some prominent examples. farber and gowa appear to have miscounted the total number of dyads. the food supply was high, but floods, unemployment, and panic made it harder for those in need to obtain food. a second recent study confirms the connection between economic freedom and economic growth. the political philosopher michael walzer makes this point: "even in the absence of free elections, it is possible to have a free press, religious freedom, associational pluralism, the right to organize unions, the right to move freely, and so on. siverson and juliann emmons, "birds of a feather," journal of conflict resolution, vol. 61: for examples of institutional/structural arguments, see bruce bueno de mesquita and david lalman, war and reason: domestic and institutional imperatives (new haven: yale university press, 1992); t. such claims are implicit in some critiques of the logic and evidence, but not all such critiques identify the factors that are alleged to count for the absence of wars between democracies. third, and most generally, some east asians claim that liberal democracy is not a suitable form of government for asian countries, because asia has a different set of cultural values that include a strong emphasis on communalism." in contrast, only 20 of the world's 73 nondemocracies were "partly free" and 53 were "not free. the united states would be more secure if russia, china, and at least some countries in the arab and islamic worlds became stable democracies. see also jean drã¨ze and amartya sen, hunger and public action (oxford: clarendon press, 1989). in addition to above cases, others that are mentioned frequently include: lebanon-israel, 1948; germany in the 1930s; and israel's 1982 invasion of lebanon. people die in wars, accidents, and violent crimes, as well as from aids, heart disease, numerous types of cancer, and alzheimer's disease, among many other factors.

and the perpetrator of the alleged "state terrorist" acts in each case was the united states itself, which suggests that the united states has little to fear from other democracies. sen points out that the democratic political processes that prevent famines may be less effective in avoiding less urgent problems such as nonextreme hunger, illiteracy, and gender discrimination. the sun yat-sen institute of social sciences and philosophy, academia. other analyses have concluded that the influence of other variables, including geographical proximity and wealth, do not detract from the significance of the finding that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another. bruce bueno de mesquita and david lalman argue that "some political institutions help foster beliefs . along with other relevant works on democracy promotion in us foreign policy history (above all see smith 2012), us foreign policy and democracy promotion seeks to describe how the ‘democratic discourse’ entered and is entering us action abroad. paper argues that the united states should make promoting democracy abroad one of its central foreign-policy goals.: how the kmt lost and the dpp won the 2000 presidential election,". democracy," in robert slater, steven dorr, and barry schutz,Eds. smith points out in his wide-ranging first chapter (13-36): liberal internationalism, or foreign intervention to pursue liberal goals, is part of us foreign policy tradition and, even if re-interpreted or scaled down, has never been abandoned."71 thus spreading democracy will produce more and better alliance partners for the united states. rummel finds that democracies-by which he means liberal democracies-between 1900 and 1987 saw only 0. a full-fledged liberal democracy with guarantees of civil liberties, a relatively free economic market, and an independent judiciary might be even less likely to suffer famines, but it appears that the rudiments of electoral democracy will suffice to prevent famines. achieving this goal is worth the risk that some distasteful leaders will win elections and use these victories at the ballot box to legitimize their illiberal rule. ward and kristian gleditsch, "democratizing for peace," american political science review, vol. historical outlook presented in us foreign policy and democracy promotion seems to avoid any particular ‘paradigmatic’ approach in the study of this ir field (for a literature review on the relations between the study of democracy promotion and the major ir theories, see wolff & wurm 2011). freedom house's 1997 survey of "freedom in the world" found that 79 out of 118 democracies could be classified as "free" and 39 were "partly free" and, of those, 29 qualified as "high partly free. holding a free and fair election requires that these principles be followed. in an important two-part article published in 1983, michael doyle compares all international wars between 1816 and 1980 and a list of liberal states. as one scholar puts it, "liberalism's ends are life and property, and its means are liberty and toleration. for example, in liberal democracies liberal norms and democratic processes probably work in tandem to synergistically produce the democratic peace. these conditions are likely to be met when an impartial court system exists and can require individuals to enforce contracts. holding a free and fair election requires that these principles be followed. mansfield and snyder identify several useful policies to mitigate any potential risks of democratization. contain corruption," prem notes, the world bank, june 1999,"political culture and. third section summarizes and rebuts some of the most prominent recent arguments against promoting democracy. american occupation and the bungled effort to bring democracy to. 22: for definitions of liberty and classic discussions of the topic, see the writings of immanuel kant, john locke, john stuart mill, and the federalist papers."15 liberalism calls for guarantees of the rights of the individual, including freedom from arbitrary authority, freedom of religion, the right to own and exchange private property, rights to equal opportunity in health care, education, and employment, and the rights to political participation and representation. 43: amartya sen, "freedoms and needs," the new republic, january 10 and 17, 1994, p. sudan and ethiopia, which were nondemocracies, suffered major famines, whereas the democracies of botswana and zimbabwe did not."like the president he now serves, anton doesn't understand how the global trading order actually works. 118: for a discussion of russia that takes the mansfield/snyder thesis into account and explains why russia's democratization has not cause much war, see michael mcfaul, "a precarious peace: domestic politics and the making of russian foreign policy," international security, vol. because the case for democratization is rarely made comprehensively, the paper explicates the arguments for why democracy promotes liberty, prevents famines, and fosters economic development. 24-41; and yoichi funabashi, "the asianization of asia," foreign affairs, vol. 48: amartya sen, "the economics of life and death," scientific american, may 1993, pp. botswana's food production fell by 17% and zimbabwe's by 38% between 1979-81 and 1983-84, whereas sudan and ethiopia saw a decline in food production of 11-12% during the same period. these arguments include criticisms of the democratic peace hypothesis, the proposition that the process of democratization actually increases the risk of war, claims that in many countries democratic elections are at best irrelevant and at worst harmful, and the argument that the emergence of the "asian model" of political and economic development demonstrates that liberal democracy is neither appropriate nor necessary in many countries.. democracies will ally with the united statesfourth, the global spread of democracy will advance american interests by creating more potential allies for the united states., in diamond, linz and lipset democracy in developing countries:Latin america (1989). linz and seymour martin lipset (boulder, co:Lynne rienner publishers, 1995). this argument is most memorably expressed in the american declaration of independence: "we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . the british fabian socialist sidney webb, for example, articulated this view clearly: "the perfect and fitting development of each individual is not necessarily the utmost and highest cultivation of his own personality, but the filling, in the best possible way, of his humble function in the great social machine. in an important two-part article published in 1983, michael doyle compares all international wars between 1816 and 1980 and a list of liberal states. second, some asians argue that the spread democracy would aggravate ethnic tensions and increase ethnic conflict within asian countries. some democracies, including india and the philippines, have languished economically, at least until the last few years. at the most general level, democratic leaders are constrained by the public, which is sometimes pacific and generally slow to mobilize for war. 617-648; zeev maoz and nasrin abdolali, "regime type and international conflict," journal of conflict resolution, vol. the founding fathers declared that all were created equal-not just those in britain's 13 american colonies-and that to secure the 'unalienable rights' of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, people had the right to establish governments that derive 'their just powers from the consent of the governed. rummel, "power, genocide, and mass murder," journal of peace research, vol. particularly as socioeconomic development elevates societies above subsistence levels, individuals desire more choice and autonomy in their lives. argument: skeptics suggest that, if the democratic peace proposition is valid, we should find that pairs of democracies behave in crises in way that reveals that shared democracy, not considerations of power and interest, caused them to avoid war. if americans care about improving the lives of the citizens of other countries, then the case for promoting democracy grows stronger to the extent that promoting democracy is an effective means to achieve this end.: the most sophisticated statistical analyses of the evidence for the democratic peace take these variables into account and still conclude that there is a strong relationship between democracy and peace. this argument is most memorably expressed in the american declaration of independence: "we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . 112-146; and peter liberman, "trading with the enemy: security and relative economic gains. in addition, the korean and japanese cases show that democracy and growth can go hand in hand."30 (2) democratic polities allow opposition to be expressed openly and have regular processes for the peaceful transfer of power. democracies, however, may have found themselves allied to one another against nondemocracies because they share a commitment to democratic values and want to defend them against threats from nondemocracies.. interests include a reduction in threats to the united states, fewer refugees attempting to enter the united states, and better economic partners for american trade and investment. the principle that leaders should be selected in free and fair elections can become an international norm that can be used to persuade authoritarian leaders to step aside, sometimes gracefully., "moving out of poverty: growth and freedom from the bottom. as the editors recall, “trying to understand american foreign policy through the twentieth century without reference to american democracy [is] almost impossible” (1-2).. democracies will ally with the united statesfourth, the global spread of democracy will advance american interests by creating more potential allies for the united states. norms of trust and respect for the autonomy of liberal regimes would rule out such behavior, just as they proscribe war. claims that the asian model is in a crisis and will be abandoned are probably overstated, just as asian leaders tended to overstate the virtues of their approach when their economies were flourishing. 169 (note 2), and bruce russett and james lee ray, "why the democratic-peace proposition lives," review of international studies, vol., politics in developing countries,Uncivic society and the descent into praetorianism," in diamond,Linz, and lipset, eds.

farber and joanne gowa, "polities and peace," in michael e. 63: see bruce russett and zeev maoz, "normative and structural causes of democratic peace," american political science review, vol. gurr and barbara harff, ethnic conflict and world politics (boulder, colorado: westview press, 1994); and larry diamond and marc f. 89-102; and david collier and steven levitsky, "democracy with adjectives: conceptual innovation in comparative research," world politics, vol.. institutional/structural explanationsinstitutional/structural explanations for the democratic peace contend that democratic decision-making procedures and institutional constraints prevent democracies from waging war on one another., debating the democratic peace; raymond cohen, "pacific unions: a reappraisal of the theory that democracies do not fight one another," review of international studies, vol. a considerable body of opinion suggests that famines and hunger are not caused by a global or country-by-country shortage of food but by the failure to distribute food to those who most need it. sen points out that the democratic political processes that prevent famines may be less effective in avoiding less urgent problems such as nonextreme hunger, illiteracy, and gender discrimination. trump and the emergent dominant narrative in us foreign policy. 21-22; and karatnycky, "still the bedrock of a better world. participants on both sides claimed that their opponents had been blinded by ideology and refused to view the evidence objectively. and there are probably additional explanations for why at least some democratic dyads have remained at peace., nationalism, ethnic conflict, and democracy (baltimore: johns hopkins university press, 1994. first, those who make this argument overlook the fact that threat perceptions and alliance choice often reflect shared values and political principles."hong kong on the move: american and hong kong perspectives on the. 138: i attempt to answer these questions in my contribution to christopher layne and sean m. 33: mancur olson, "dictatorship, democracy, and development," american political science review, vol. 24: adrian karatnycky, "freedom on the march," in freedom review, vol. a full-fledged liberal democracy with guarantees of civil liberties, a relatively free economic market, and an independent judiciary might be even less likely to suffer famines, but it appears that the rudiments of electoral democracy will suffice to prevent famines. freedom house's 1997 ratings show that civil liberties have improved in 10 of the countries zakaria identifies as "democratizing" and fallen in only 4. in a democracy, the executive branch, legislative branch, and the public all constrain each other's ability to make rash and hasty decisions for war.. suberu, in andrew reynolds, (ed) the architecture of democracy:Constitutional design, conflict management and democracy (oxford:Oxford university press, 2002). scholars, policymakers, and commentators embraced the idea that democratization could become america's next mission., as human beings, american should and do feel some obligation to improve the well-being of other human beings. mansfield and snyder recognize that "it is probably true that a world where more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the united states. the logic and evidence of a democratic peace are also summarized, as are the ways in which u. have presented several important challenges to the deductive logic and empirical bases of the democratic peace proposition., as human beings, american should and do feel some obligation to improve the well-being of other human beings."institutional design,Ethnic conflict management, and democracy in nigeria," with rotimi. dixon, "democracy and the peaceful settlement of international conflict," american political science review, vol. other quantitative studies challenge the statistical significance of mansfield and snyder's results, suggest that there is an even stronger connection between movements toward autocracy and the onset of war, find that it is actually unstable transitions and reversals of democratization that increase the probability of war, and argue that democratization diminishes the likelihood of militarized international disputes., the cold war and after: prospects for peace, expanded edition (cambridge, mass. similar logic would imply that, for example, citizens in any country should act on the basis of the assumption that domestic law and order might collapse into anarchy and violence., kaplan and, to a lesser extent, zakaria, exaggerate the degree to which elections per se are responsible for the problems of new democracies, many of which had the same problems before elections were held. 26: for some discussions of liberalism and its critics, see holmes, the anatomy of antiliberalism; and michael j. they frequently cite the war of 1812, the spanish-american war, finland's decision to align with germany against the western powers and the soviet union during world war two, the american civil war, world war one, and the wars that followed the disintegration of yugoslavia in the 1990s. sandel, liberalism and the limits of justice (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1982). first, democracies-especially liberal democracies-are more likely to have market economies, and market economies tend to produce economic growth over the long run. two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization and economic performance. critics have offered four major challenges to the logic of the democratic peace: (a) there is no consensus on the causal mechanisms that keep democracies at peace: (b) the possibility that democracies may turn into nondemocracies means that even democracies operate according to realist principles; (c) the structural-institutional explanation of the democratic peace is flawed, not least because its logic also would predict that democracies are less likely to be involved in any wars, not just wars with other democracies; and (d) the normative explanation of the democratic peace is unpersuasive. 116: mansfield and snyder, "democratization and the danger of war," p. rummel, "power, genocide, and mass murder," journal of peace research, vol. after a brief discussion of definitions of democracy and liberalism, the paper summarizes the reasons why the spread of democracy— especially liberal democracy— benefits the citizens of new democracies, promotes international peace, and serves u. 112-146; and peter liberman, "trading with the enemy: security and relative economic gains. in 1995, the population reference bureau reported that americans kill each other at a rate 17 times higher than in japan and ireland, 10 times the rates in germany and france, and five times the rate in canada. it assumes that states must base their foreign policies almost entirely on worst-case scenarios.'s struggle for democracy and good governance: a festschrift for oyeleye oyediran. in africa," hoover institution, essays in public policy,"civil society and the.- belfer center for science and international affairs, harvard kennedy school. podcast: shafeeq ghabra "transition in regime, state, and society in the arab world"., the tendency of democracies to ally with one another is further evidence of the special characteristics of democratic foreign policy."39 these conditions also happen to be those that are necessary to maintain a stable system of free and fair elections and to uphold liberal principles of individual rights. mansfield and snyder themselves point out that "reversals of democratization are nearly as risky as democratization itself," thereby bolstering the case for assisting the consolidation of new democracies. 185; christopher layne, "kant or cant: the myth of the democratic peace," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds. first, western democracy allows for too much liberty, and this excessive individual freedom causes moral decline and social collapse."45 on the other hand, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes are not accountable to the public; they are less likely to pay a political price for failing to prevent famines. 108: see russett, grasping the democratic peace, and maoz, "the controversy over the democratic peace" for summaries of these studies. democratic states thus can pursue a policy of accommodation toward other democracies, hedge their bets with more cautious policies toward unstable or uncertain democracies, and abandon accommodation when democracies turn into nondemocracies. in the anarchic and competitive realm of international politics, democracies cannot avoid making such calculations.” discussion paper, 98-07, belfer center for science and international affairs, harvard kennedy school, march 1998. 118: for a discussion of russia that takes the mansfield/snyder thesis into account and explains why russia's democratization has not cause much war, see michael mcfaul, "a precarious peace: domestic politics and the making of russian foreign policy," international security, vol. see rummel, "libertarianism and international violence," journal of conflict resolution, vol. and the "soft authoritarian" challenge to liberal democracy was not persuasive, even before the asian economic turmoil of 1997 and 1998 undermined claims for the superiority of "asian values. 97: spiro, "the insignificance of the liberal peace"; and ray, democracy and international conflict, pp. 357-360; and amartya sen, food, economics and entitlements (helsinki: world institute for development economic research, 1986). democratic states thus can pursue a policy of accommodation toward other democracies, hedge their bets with more cautious policies toward unstable or uncertain democracies, and abandon accommodation when democracies turn into nondemocracies.. the benefits of the spread of democracymost americans assume that democracy is a good thing and that the spread of democracy will be beneficial. although this claim has been most closely identified with sen, other scholars who have studied famines and hunger reach similar conclusions.

democracies have virtually never massacred their own citizens on a large scale, although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime. people die in wars, accidents, and violent crimes, as well as from aids, heart disease, numerous types of cancer, and alzheimer's disease, among many other factors. since india became independent and democratic, the country has suffered severe crop failures and food shortages in 1968, 1973, 1979, and 1987, but it has never suffered a famine. see strobe talbott, "democracy and the national interest," foreign affairs, vol. the first section of this paper defines democracy and the closely related concept of liberalism. first, those who make this argument overlook the fact that threat perceptions and alliance choice often reflect shared values and political principles. in most democracies, the legislative and executive branches check the war-making power of each other. farber and gowa appear to have miscounted the total number of dyads." in contrast, only 20 of the world's 73 nondemocracies were "partly free" and 53 were "not free. 7note 15: john owen, "how liberalism produces democratic peace," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds. addition, critics of the democratic-peace proposition have not tested it fairly; they have not deduced the full range of predictions that the normative and institutional model makes about how democracies will avoid war. 265-276; susan peterson, "how democracies differ: public opinion, state structure, and the lessons of the fashoda crisis," security studies, vol. the world's principal sponsors of international terrorism are harsh, authoritarian regimes, including syria, iran, iraq, north korea, libya, and sudan.: mansfield and snyder have advanced an important new argument, but even if partially true, it does not refute the case for spreading democracy internationally. democracy does not guarantee economic success and may even hinder it.. democracy leads to liberty and liberty is goodthe first way in which the spread of democracy enhances the lives of those who live in democracies is by promoting individual liberty, including freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, and freedom to own private property. spiro, "the insignificance of the liberal peace," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds."20 as i argue below, one of the most important benefits of the spread of democracy-and especially of liberal democracy-is an expansion of human liberty. which policies work and under what circumstances do they work? foreign policy and democracy promotion: from theodore roosevelt to barack obama. the paper then turns to a rebuttal of four prominent recent arguments against the benefits of spreading democracy: (1) the claim that the democratic peace is a myth; (2) the argument that the process of democratization increases the risk of war; (3) arguments that democratic elections are harmful in societies that are not fully liberal; and (4) claims that "asian values" can undergird polities based on "soft authoritarianism" that are superior to liberal democracies. in addition, the korean and japanese cases show that democracy and growth can go hand in hand. wars usually come out of mids, which create the opportunity for leaders to play nationalist cards and to otherwise behave and mansfield and snyder fear.(prepared for the national policy forum on terrorism, security, and.. workers would have to compete with foreign industries where labor and environmental standards are much lower than they are in the united states. but whether states have fewer civil liberties than political rights is a problematic way to distinguish between liberal and illiberal democracies. rummel calls genocide and mass murder "democide," and distinguishes such killings from battle deaths. germany in 1914 was not governed by liberal principles and its foreign policy was directed by the kaiser, not the elected reichstag. the human race is not about to embrace a cosmopolitan moral vision in which borders and national identities become irrelevant. 89-102; and david collier and steven levitsky, "democracy with adjectives: conceptual innovation in comparative research," world politics, vol."note 132: for examples of these views, see fareed zakaria, "culture is destiny: a conversation with lee kwan yew," foreign affairs, vol. finland engaged in virtually no direct hostilities with the western allies during world war two; it fought almost entirely against communist russia. moreover, authoritarian and totalitarian rulers often have political incentives to use famine as a means of exterminating their domestic opponents. some studies find that disputes between democracies and nondemocracies are less likely to escalate to war that disputes between nondemocracies, see zeev maoz and nasrin abdolai, "regime types and international conflict, 1817-1976," journal of conflict resolution, vol. this disaster later led mao zedong to concede that "without democracy, you have no understanding of what is happening down below. but as crises develop between liberal democracies, they tend to act on the basis of their shared norms and draw back from the brink of war. these factors exist when leaders face periodic elections and when the press is free to report information that might embarrass the government. but most observers-including some east asians-would argue that these countries have curtailed political liberties (and sometimes bragged about it in the debate over "asian values") and are hardly a model of liberalization that the united states should encourage. 131: historically, of course, democracy has faced ideological challenges from marxism, fascism, and monarchism.. combining normative and structural explanationssome studies have attempted to test the relative power of the normative and institutional/structural explanations of the democratic peace."54 subsequent statistical studies have found that this absence of war between democracies is statistically significant and is not the result of random chance. mansfield and jack snyder, "democratization and the danger of war," in brown, lynn-jones, and miller, eds. the short response to most critiques of liberty is that there appears to be a universal demand for liberty among human beings."14these attempts to expand the criteria for democracy reveal that it makes more sense to talk about degrees of democracy instead of neatly dividing states into democracies and nondemocracies. 11: see, for example, james lee ray, democracy and international conflict (columbia: university of south carolina press, 1995), pp. democracies resolve their domestic conflicts without violence, and they expect that other democracies will resolve inter-democratic international disputes peacefully. for example, tracing the process of how events unfolded should reveal that the publics in democracies did not want war with other democracies, that leaders did not make military threats against other democracies, and that democracies adopted accommodating behavior toward other democracies. matthews, iii, "current gains and future outcomes: when cumulative relative gains matter," international security, vol.. liberalism and democracydemocracy can be defined as a set of political procedures involving participation and competition, but liberalism is a political philosophy that is based on the principle of individual freedom. democracy is not an unalloyed good and the united states should not blindly attempt to spread democracy to the exclusion of all other goals, but u. secondly, for democracy promotion scholars and experts, this book provides an interesting overview on how different us presidents have interpreted the relations between us external action and democratic (or liberal) values, and it is a ready-to-use handbook for approaching the study of us democracy promotion or its particular application in certain contexts and areas of the world.. divorce rates, out-of-wedlock births, and crime rates, are evidence of liberty run wild., kaplan and, to a lesser extent, zakaria, exaggerate the degree to which elections per se are responsible for the problems of new democracies, many of which had the same problems before elections were held. third reason may operate in some circumstances: democratic governments are more likely to have the political legitimacy necessary to embark on difficult and painful economic reforms. considerable evidence indicates that liberal democracy, with its emphasis on tolerance, cooperation, political accommodation, and respect for civil liberties, provides the best recipe for long-term domestic stability. new democracies also need external assistance to build up the journalistic infrastructure that will support a "marketplace of ideas" that can prevent manipulation of public opinion and nationalistic mythmaking. spreading democracy also will directly advance the national interests of the united states, because democracies will not launch wars or terrorist attacks against the united states, will not produce refugees seeking asylum in the united states, and will tend to ally with the united states. however, us foreign policy and democracy promotion has the force to help the reader at least in two ways. old elites that are threatened by democratization can be given "golden parachutes" that enable them to at least retain some of their wealth and to stay out of jail. elections do not only remove unpopular authoritarians, however; they also encourage the development of liberal habits and principles such as freedom of speech and of the press. and democracies provide better climates for american overseas investment, by virtue of their political stability and market economies. these arguments include criticisms of the democratic peace hypothesis, the proposition that the process of democratization actually increases the risk of war, claims that in many countries democratic elections are at best irrelevant and at worst harmful, and the argument that the emergence of the "asian model" of political and economic development demonstrates that liberal democracy is neither appropriate nor necessary in many countries."15 liberalism calls for guarantees of the rights of the individual, including freedom from arbitrary authority, freedom of religion, the right to own and exchange private property, rights to equal opportunity in health care, education, and employment, and the rights to political participation and representation. 90: on the weaknesses of the normative explanation more generally, see ray, democracy and international conflict, pp. public jingoism and enthusiasm for war accompanied the outbreak of world war one and helped cause the spanish-american war. 12: for discussions of the differences between ancient and modern conceptions of democracy, see m.: these criticisms of electoral democracy are important reminders that democracy is imperfect and so are democracies. makes for democracy," with juan linz and seymour martin lipset,In diamond, linz and lipset, eds.

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